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POSSIBLE FUTURES OF FAIR USE 
Pamela Samuelson* 
Abstract: This Article celebrates the twenty-one-year majority status of Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. Campbell has unquestionably had transformative impacts on the 
doctrine of fair use in U.S. copyright case law, making several significant contributions that 
go well beyond the Court’s endorsement of the “transformative” nature of a use as tipping in 
favor of fairness. Several notable cases have built upon the analytical foundation established 
in Campbell. 
This Article also considers possible futures of fair use. What will fair use look like 
twenty-one years from now? Will it stay much as it is right now, or will it change, and if so, 
how? Some critics think that fair use has gone too far and are urging a return to a more 
restrictive scope for the doctrine. This Article considers and responds to various critiques of 
the present state of fair use law, including whether fair use is consistent with international 
treaty obligations. This Article concludes that fair use will survive these critiques and will 
continue to evolve to provide a useful mechanism for balancing the interests of authors and 
other rights holders, on the one hand, and subsequent authors and other users of copyrighted 
works, on the other hand. It discusses some new horizons that commentators have imagined 
for fair use to address certain problems that beset copyright law today. Of the possible futures 
of fair use, that which would preserve the status quo and expand fair use into new horizons is 
the one most likely to occur and most to be desired. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.1 has unquestionably had 
transformative impacts on the doctrine of fair use in the U.S. copyright 
case law.2 These transformations, though widely acknowledged,3 have 
not been universally acclaimed.4 On the occasion of Campbell having 
attained its twenty-one-year majority status, it is fitting to consider the 
possible futures of fair use. What will fair use look like twenty-one years 
from now? Will it stay much as it is right now, with cases simply 
working out details within its current contours? Or has it gone too far, 
and will the pendulum swing back toward a more restrictive scope for 
the doctrine? If it has gone too far, in what ways should it be curtailed? 
Will some uses that today are free as fair uses be permitted in the future 
under an obligation to pay licensing fees for the uses? Or will fair use 
continue to expand? And in what new directions might it evolve? 
I am here to celebrate the transformations that Campbell has wrought 
in fair use law and to defend the present state of fair use law from its 
critics. I am also here to share ideas about some new horizons that I and 
others have imagined for fair use to address certain problems that beset 
1. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
2. See, e.g., Laura Quilter, How Parodies Transformed Fair Use, COPYRIGHT & INFO. POL’Y 
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://blogs.umass.edu/lquilter/2015/02/23/fair-use-week-how-parodies-transformed-fair-
use/. The judicially created fair use doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107. It directs courts to 
consider a nonexhaustive list of four factors in determining whether a use is fair:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.  
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
3. The Campbell decision gave Judge Leval “enormous joy.” Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 19 (1994) 
[hereinafter Leval, Souter’s Rescue]; see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair 
Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615 (2015); Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1449, 1465 (1997); Neil W. Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 715, 722–23, 736–38 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 47, 55, 73 
(2012); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2549–55 (2009) 
[hereinafter Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses]; Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 869 (2015). 
4. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 14–22 (2014) (statement of 
June M. Besek, Executive Director, Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/the-scope-of-fair-use [hereinafter Besek Testimony]. 
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copyright law today, such as the enforceability of mass-market license 
restrictions that purport to override fair use and bypassing technical 
protection measures that impede the making of fair and other privileged 
uses of digital works. 
As the scholarly papers presented at this symposium attest, Campbell 
has made several significant contributions to fair use law in the U.S. Part 
I of this Article discusses my view of these contributions, which go well 
beyond the Court’s endorsement of the “transformative” nature of a use 
as tipping in favor of fairness. Part I also discusses several notable cases 
that have built upon the analytical foundation established in Campbell. 
Part II considers and responds to various critiques of the present state of 
fair use law. Campbell itself, interestingly, is not the target of the fair-
use-has-gone-too-far critiques, but a number of its progeny are. The 
most serious charge leveled against the post-Campbell fair use case law 
is that fair use, under Campbell’s influence, has put the United States out 
of compliance with its international treaty obligations. Part III expresses 
confidence that fair use will survive these critiques and will continue to 
evolve to provide a useful mechanism for balancing the interests of 
authors and other rights holders, on the one hand, and subsequent 
authors and other users of copyrighted works, on the other hand. Of the 
possible futures of fair use, that which would preserve the status quo and 
take fair use into new horizons is the one most likely to occur and most 
to be desired. Part III explores these new horizons. 
I. CAMPBELL AS A TRANSFORMATIVE FAIR USE CASE 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. was the most significant 
copyright decision of the twentieth century in terms of doctrinal 
developments of the law.5 In Campbell, the Supreme Court overturned a 
lower court ruling that Luther Campbell’s group, 2 Live Crew, made an 
unfair use of Roy Orbison’s song “Pretty Woman” when recording a rap 
parody version of it.6 Justice Souter wrote an eloquent opinion for a 
5. The Court’s decisions in Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), and 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), have been cited more often 
than Campbell since 1994. Most cites to Feist are for its modicum of creativity originality standard 
and the rejection of sweat-of-the-brow copyrights. See, e.g., Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 
F.3d 276, 281–82, 295 n.14 (3d Cir. 2004); Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 
F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1344 
n.11, 1346 (5th Cir. 1994). Sony may have been more significant than Campbell in terms of its 
impact on developments in the information technology field, but not in terms of doctrinal 
developments. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual 
Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1850–75 (2006). 
6. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572. 
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unanimous Court. More important than the eloquence was the substantial 
guidance the Court provided about how fair use cases should be 
analyzed. Many fair use decisions rendered in the past two decades have 
cited Campbell.7 In addition, the law review commentary on Campbell 
has been voluminous.8 
Section A reviews the many contributions—numbering, by my count, 
at least a dozen—that Campbell has made to fair use jurisprudence. 
Section B discusses the cases that embraced and built on these 
contributions. 
A. Campbell’s Contributions Go Beyond Transformativeness 
The most notable and influential contributions of the Campbell 
decision have, of course, been, first, the Court’s emphasis on the 
“transformative” nature of a defendant’s use as weighing in favor of fair 
use and, second, its expansive definition of what constitutes a 
“transformative” use. (I will address these two landmark contributions at 
the end of this subsection.) Several others of Campbell’s contributions to 
fair use jurisprudence tend to be overlooked or glossed over in 
discussions about the impact of that decision. Yet these less noticed 
aspects of Campbell have also reshaped how fair use cases are analyzed 
and deserve due attention. The remainder of this subsection reviews 
Justice Souter’s contributions to fair use law, emphasizing first the less 
noted contributions and then returning to the transformativeness 
contributions. 
Campbell was, for instance, influential in its abjuring the dual 
negative presumptions the Court had seemed to endorse in two earlier 
fair use decisions.9 I count this as the third of Campbell’s contributions 
to fair use law. In Sony of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,10 the 
Court had directed lower courts to presume that a challenged use was 
unfair if it was commercial in nature and, further, to presume harm to the 
plaintiff’s market when a defendant made commercial uses of the rights 
holder’s work.11 This dicta might have had a less powerful impact on 
7. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
8. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Sheep in Goats’ Clothing: Satire and Fair Use After Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 257 (2004); Laura A. Heymann, 
Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2008); 
Leval, Souter’s Rescue, supra note 3. The WestlawNext case page includes 2,374 law review 
articles citing to Campbell (as of March 1, 2015).  
9. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–84, 591. 
10. 464 U.S. 417. 
11. Id. at 451. 
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subsequent cases—after all, Sony involved a private noncommercial 
use12—had the Supreme Court not a year later endorsed the dual 
negative presumptions in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises.13 Harper & Row involved the publication of excerpts of 
President Ford’s memoirs in an issue of The Nation that “scooped” the 
excerpts from a “purloined” manuscript; this harmed the market because 
Time magazine subsequently cancelled its contract to publish similar 
excerpts to whet the public’s interest in the book.14 
The Sixth Circuit in Campbell had invoked the dual negative 
presumptions in its ruling that Campbell’s use of the song was unfair.15 
The Supreme Court, however, declared that the Sixth Circuit had 
misread Sony, which called for a “sensitive balancing of interests.”16 The 
commerciality of a defendant’s purpose, opined Justice Souter in 
Campbell, is a factor to be considered and may, in some contexts, weigh 
against fair use.17 But a commercial purpose must be considered in 
context, and it should be given less weight in transformative use cases 
because of the lower likelihood that such uses will supplant demand for 
the original.18 
Although Campbell repudiated the dual presumptions in cases 
involving transformative uses, it did not renounce the dual presumptions 
of unfairness and of harm to markets altogether.19 If Campbell is to be 
believed, the negative presumptions still apply to non-transformative 
12. Justice Stevens’ main concern in Sony was to announce a presumption of fairness when a use 
was private and noncommercial. Id. at 450–51. That presumption would put the burden of proof of a 
meaningful likelihood of harm on the plaintiff. Id. at 451. It was unnecessary for this purpose to 
create or announce a presumption as to commercial uses, but it may be that this was a political 
concession to get agreement about a noncommercial presumption. 
13. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In Harper & Row, the Court quoted Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (“[E]very 
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly 
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.”), and cited to Roy Export Co. Establishment v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and the Nimmer 
treatise for the proposition that “[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole 
motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the 
copyrighted material without paying the customary price.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. 
14. Id. at 567. Because of the presence of “clear-cut evidence of actual damage” in the case, id., 
the Court did not discuss the presumption of harm due to commercial use; rather it focused on 
defendant’s motive to profit. Id. at 562.  
15. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Sony, 464 
U.S. at 449, and Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562). 
16. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584–85 (1994) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 
455 n.40). 
17. Id. at 585. 
18. Id. at 591. 
19. Id. at 585, 591–92. 
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commercial uses,20 although this too is dicta that the Court may 
eventually decide should not apply across the board. By maintaining the 
Sony presumptions for non-transformative commercial uses, the Court 
may have inadvertently contributed to the intensity of struggles in 
subsequent cases over whether uses are transformative. At least some of 
the expansiveness of judicial interpretations of transformative purposes, 
as in the search engine cases discussed below, may be aimed at avoiding 
the Sony commercial use presumptions.21 
A fourth contribution Campbell has made to the fair use case law has 
been its dismissal of the argument that good faith and fair dealing were 
necessary to fair use determinations. In Harper & Row, the Court had 
stated that the propriety or impropriety of the defendant’s conduct 
should be considered in deciding fair use cases, and expressed support 
for the proposition that fair use “presupposes ‘good faith’ and ‘fair 
dealing.’”22 In a law review article written after Harper & Row, Judge 
Pierre Leval criticized the notion that good faith was relevant to fair use 
rulings.23 In Campbell, the Court expressed its agreement with Judge 
Leval on this point, rejecting Acuff-Rose’s argument that Campbell was 
an unfair user because he acted in bad faith.24 
Revival of the public interest as a factor worthy of consideration in 
fair use cases was a fifth contribution. In Harper & Row, The Nation 
made much of the public interest in getting access to the news about 
Ford’s explanation of his pardon of former President Nixon as a 
justification for its publication of this news.25 The Court expressed 
skepticism about the public interest as part of a fair use defense.26 In 
Campbell, however, the Court affirmed the importance of the public 
interest in access to works and information they may contain as 
meaningful considerations in fair use cases.27 The Court explicitly stated 
20. Id. at 591 (“[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an 
original, it clearly . . . serves as a market replacement for [the original].”). 
21. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2007). See 
infra Part III.A for a discussion of the desirability of repudiating the remaining dual negative 
presumptions. The search engine cases are discussed infra text accompanying notes 112–119. 
22. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (quoting Time 
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
23. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1126–27 (1990). The 
impact of Judge Leval’s article on the Court’s transformativeness doctrine is discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 56–64.  
24. 510 U.S. at 585 n.18 (citing Leval’s article, among other sources). 
25. 471 U.S. at 556. 
26. Id. at 557. 
27. 510 U.S. at 578 n.10. 
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that the public interest in access to a second work should be a factor in 
deciding to withhold injunctive relief and order monetary compensation 
instead in close fair use cases.28 In the aftermath of Campbell, courts 
have sometimes taken the public interest—that is, spillover effects of a 
fair use ruling on non-parties to the litigation—into account in 
determining whether a use was fair.29 
Although the Court in Campbell expressly declined to adopt a 
presumption that parodies of copyrighted works were fair uses,30 the 
parody case law after Campbell has resulted in many fair use rulings.31 
Thus, a sixth contribution of Campbell to fair use case law would seem 
to be that parodies are de facto presumptively fair. Some litigants have 
tried to stretch the parody category beyond its conventional bounds so 
that they too may enjoy the halo effect of Campbell’s perspectives on 
parody.32 
Campbell distinguished parody from satire, seemingly derogating 
satire as less worthy than parody of being found a fair use.33 In the 
aftermath of Campbell, a very clever satire of a Dr. Seuss book was held 
an infringement in no small part due to Campbell’s influence on this 
point, even though that satire had a transformative purpose and was quite 
unlikely to supplant demand for the original.34 The distinction between 
parody and satire has been criticized in the literature, and some more 
recent cases suggest that the distinction has become less potent over 
time.35 
A seventh important contribution of Campbell to the fair use case law 
has been its insistence that courts should consider all four of the fair use 
28. Id. 
29. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“In some instances, it is readily apparent that DK’s image display enhances the reader’s 
understanding of the biographical text.”). 
30. 510 U.S. at 581. 
31. See, e.g., Brownmark Films LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012) (South 
Park parody of viral video); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(parody of Mattel’s Barbie doll); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 
1998) (parody of a photograph). 
32. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(characterizing a critical retelling of Gone with the Wind story as a parody). 
33. 510 U.S. at 580–81. 
34. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).  
35. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a 
Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 546, 548–64 (1998); Gregory K. Jung, Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises v. Penguin Books, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 119, 119–20 (1998). A recent example of a 
successful fair use defense involving satire is Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (satirical transformation of photograph of a mayor to mock him held fair use). 
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factors—the purpose of the challenged use, the nature of the copyrighted 
work, the amount and substantiality of the taking, and the potential for 
harm to the work’s market—and weigh them not only together, but also 
in relation to one another.36 Prior to Campbell, fair use decisions had 
sometimes seemed a bit like math games. If two of the fair use factors, 
for instance, supported a finding of fair use, one was neutral, and one 
tipped against fair use, then the use was likely to be fair, but if two 
factors disfavored fair use and one was neutral, the likely outcome 
would be an unfairness ruling.37 After Campbell, courts have generally 
engaged in a much more nuanced analysis of fair use. 
As Professor Reese explains, Campbell was innovative in directing 
courts to consider whether the amount the defendant took from the 
plaintiff’s work was “reasonable” in light of his purpose.38 Most prior 
cases had considered the “amount taken” factor as though it was a stand-
alone consideration,39 although sometimes courts considered whether 
that amount was necessary instead of merely reasonable.40 
Campbell also directed that the purpose factor should be considered in 
relation to the harm factor and given different weight in different 
contexts.41 When a use was transformative, the Court opined that harm 
to markets was less likely because “market substitution is at least less 
certain [than in non-transformative use cases so] market harm may not 
be so readily inferred.”42 
Campbell also recognized more clearly than other cases that some 
market harms don’t weigh against fair use. When a parody harms the 
market for the targeted work, for instance, this may be because it was a 
“lethal parody, [which] like a scathing theater review, kills demand for 
the original.”43 This, however, “does not produce a harm cognizable 
36. 510 U.S. at 577–78. 
37. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 561–64 (2008) (describing a judicial period of courts’ “mechanical 
application” of the four fair use factors). Professor Beebe gives several examples. See, e.g., id. at 
562 n.51 (citing, as one example, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Having considered the four fair use factors and found that two weigh in favor of Arriba, one is 
neutral, and one weighs slightly in favor of Kelly, we conclude that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s 
images . . . is a fair use.”)). 
38. R. Anthony Reese, How Much Is Too Much?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 755, 778 (2015) (citing 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87). 
39. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985); 
New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 158–59 (2d Cir. 1990). 
40. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992). 
41. 510 U.S. at 591. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 592. 
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under the Copyright Act.”44 
An eighth, if more indirect, contribution of Campbell is, as Professor 
Fromer explains, a broader conception about market harm.45 After 
Campbell, it is acceptable for courts to take into account possible market 
benefits of a defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work in weighing market 
effects, not just possible negative effects. Campbell has opened the door 
to considering possible benefits and harms together in a holistic way, as 
well as in relation to the other factors. 
Campbell has also influenced how courts in fair use cases think about 
licensing. A ninth contribution is the Court’s recognition in Campbell of 
the unlikelihood that copyright owners would be willing to license 
parodic or other types of critical uses of their works.46 Parodies typically 
make fun of the works they target, and copyright owners are unlikely to 
want to license this sort of use. This was seemingly exemplified by 
Acuff-Rose’s refusal to license Campbell’s use of the Roy Orbison 
song.47 Although the Court did not expressly embrace “market failure” 
as a rationale for its observations about rights holders’ unwillingness to 
license critical commentary, commentators have interpreted Campbell as 
adopting a market failure rationale in critical commentary fair use 
cases.48 
A tenth contribution of Campbell to fair use law was the Court’s 
decision not to give a negative interpretation to a defendant’s decision 
initially to seek a license from the plaintiff which the defendant 
ultimately did not get. The fact that 2 Live Crew asked Acuff-Rose for a 
license, the Court said, “[did] not necessarily suggest that they believed 
their version was not fair use . . . . If the use is otherwise fair, then no 
permission need be sought or granted. Thus, being denied permission to 
use a work does not weigh against a finding of fair use.”49 Subsequent 
cases have been influenced by this statement.50 
An eleventh significant, albeit small, contribution of Campbell to the 
evolution of fair use law was the Court’s disinclination to give weight to 
44. Id. at 591–92. 
45. See Fromer, supra note 3. 
46. 510 U.S. at 592. 
47. Id. at 572–73. 
48. See, e.g., Anastasia P. Winslow, Rapping on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of 
Parody and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 820–23 (1996). See 
generally Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody 
Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993). 
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18. 
50. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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the arguably distasteful or vulgar nature of 2 Live Crew’s rap parody 
version of Roy Orbison’s song.51 The Sixth Circuit had taken vulgarity 
into account as weighing against fair use.52 Judge Souter’s opinion, 
however, returned to copyright first principles and aesthetic 
nondiscrimination in counseling against making any fair use judgments 
on the quality of the commentary.53 
Like Professor Loren, I am less sanguine about Campbell’s 
characterization of fair use as an affirmative defense for which the 
defendant bears the burden of proof.54 One must, I suppose, consider this 
aspect of Campbell as a twelfth contribution to the doctrine of fair use, 
although it has been a less positive contribution. As Professor Loren 
demonstrates so well, it is a mistake to say that Congress intended fair 
use to be an affirmative defense.55 It is much to be hoped for that future 
fair use cases will correct this mistake. 
Having now paid due attention to Campbell’s somewhat less 
appreciated contributions to fair use law, we can turn to Campbell’s 
elevation of transformativeness as a factor in the fair use case law. This 
has unquestionably been Campbell’s most significant contribution to fair 
use jurisprudence. The Court drew much of its inspiration about the 
significance of transformative purposes from Judge Leval’s article, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard,56 which the Court cited fourteen times. 
In considering the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of 
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work, the Court observed that “[t]he 
central purpose of th[e] investigation” was to consider 
whether the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the 
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, 
51. 510 U.S. at 582–83.  
52. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1446 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1992). Before 
Campbell, courts sometimes commented on bad taste or indecency when denying fair use defenses 
in parody cases. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 181–82 (2d Cir. 1981) (raunchy 
rendition of popular song not a fair use); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (adult comic book depiction of Disney characters not a fair use).  
53. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582–83 (“Whether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does not and 
should not matter to fair use.” (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 
(1903)). 
54. Id. at 590; Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685 
(2015). 
55. See Loren, supra note 54. 
56. Leval, supra note 23. 
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whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.”57 
The Court stated that it is “not absolutely necessary”58 for a use to be 
transformative to be fair, but noted that “the goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of 
transformative works.”59 “Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use 
doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space” in copyright law.60 And “the 
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of 
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of 
fair use.”61 
The Court recognized that “parody has an obvious claim to 
transformative value,” and that it “can provide social benefit, by 
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new 
one.”62 Parody is a form of critical commentary with a long pedigree.63 
The Court cautioned that parodies would not always be fair, but the 
transformativeness of parodic uses weighed in favor of fair use.64 
The Court’s endorsement of Judge Leval’s definition of 
transformativeness—whether the new work “adds something new, with 
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message”65—has been highly influential, even if 
the phrase has come to have an almost Delphic oracular quality. Once a 
court accepts that a use is transformative, the defendant will no longer be 
subject to the dual negative Sony presumptions, and the weight given to 
the amount taken and the possibility of harm to the plaintiff’s market 
will be mitigated. 
B. A Review of the Post-Campbell Case Law 
It was initially unclear how broad or narrow would be the range of 
possible uses that courts might deem to have a “transformative” purpose 
57. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citations omitted) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 
(No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Leval, supra note 23, at 1111). 
58. The “not absolutely necessary” language has caused some commentators to express concern 
that courts might treat nontransformative uses as presumptively unfair. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, 
Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 
YALE L.J. 535, 556 (2004). 
59. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.  
60. Id.  
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 579–81.  
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 579. 
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after the Campbell decision, or how closely courts would adhere to the 
many other directives described in the previous subsection.66 This 
subsection will consider the evolution of the judicial interpretations of 
transformativeness in the past two decades, as well as the influence 
Campbell’s other contributions have had on the case law. 
Campbell has come over time to be understood as including three 
types of uses within the transformativeness category.67 Campbell 
exemplifies one type, that which involves the transformation of some 
expression from a pre-existing work, often in the course of preparing a 
critical commentary on it, such as a parody. A second type includes 
conventional productive uses. A biographer or historian who quotes the 
exact text from a subject’s works to make a point about her temperament 
or historical significance would have “add[ed] something new”68 and 
altered the meaning or message of the original. Productive uses have 
generally been held fair in the aftermath of Campbell as long as the 
defendants took no more than was reasonable in light of their 
transformative purpose.69 A third type of transformative use case post-
Campbell arises when the defendant uses the plaintiff’s work for a 
different purpose than the original. 
An exemplar of the different purpose cases is Bill Graham Archives v. 
Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,70 in which the Second Circuit held that a 
publisher’s use of seven images of Grateful Dead concert posters was 
fair use.71 Because the book published by Dorling Kindersley (DK), 
Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip, reproduced the entirety of these 
seven posters and did not comment on them, Bill Graham Archives 
(BGA) argued the use was non-transformative.72 Relying on Judge 
66. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem 
“Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251, 262 (1998). 
67. See, e.g., Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, supra note 3, at 2544 n.40. 
68. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
69. See, e.g., Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446–47 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (ruling that unauthorized inclusion of copyrighted film clips in actor’s biographical 
film was protected fair use because the biography “was not shown to recreate the creative 
expression reposing in plaintiff’s [copyrighted] film, [but] for the transformative purpose of 
enabling the viewer to understand the actor’s modest beginnings in the film business”). 
70. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).  
71. Id. The Bill Graham Archives case is arguably an example of a productive use case. However, 
the Second Circuit treated it as a different purpose case. Subsequent different purpose non-
productive use cases have relied on Bill Graham Archives as a precedent. See, e.g., White v. West 
Publ’g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396, 399–400 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (uploading legal briefs to Westlaw 
database was a different purpose fair use). 
72. Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 608–10. This is one of the cases that Besek criticized in 
her testimony to Congress. Besek Testimony, supra note 4, at 17. Bill Graham Archives (“BGA”) 
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Leval’s article and Campbell, the Second Circuit disagreed, saying 
“DK’s actual use of each image is transformatively different from the 
original expressive purpose [of the posters].”73 The court explained the 
different purposes: 
Originally, each of BGA’s images fulfilled the dual purposes of 
artistic expression and promotion. The posters were apparently 
widely distributed to generate public interest in the Grateful 
Dead and to convey information to a large number [of] people 
about the band’s forthcoming concerts. In contrast, DK used 
each of BGA’s images as historical artifacts to document and 
represent the actual occurrence of Grateful Dead concert events 
featured on Illustrated Trip’s timeline.74 
The highly artistic nature of the concert posters might have seemed to 
weigh against fair use. However, with another citation to Campbell, the 
Second Circuit regarded this factor as “of limited usefulness where the 
creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.”75 
While copying the entirety of the posters might have weighed against 
fair use before Campbell, the Second Circuit, again quoting Campbell, 
noted that “the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and 
character of the use.”76 The court concluded that DK’s use was “tailored 
to further its transformative purpose because DK’s reduced size 
reproductions of BGA’s images in their entirety displayed the minimal 
image size and quality necessary to ensure the reader’s recognition of 
the images as historical artifacts of Grateful Dead concert events.”77 
Campbell’s influence was also evident in the Second Circuit’s 
analysis of the harm-to-the-market factor. BGA pointed out that DK had 
licensed other images for its Grateful Dead book and had been in 
negotiations with BGA to license the use of these seven posters in the 
book.78 BGA claimed as market harm the lost license fees DK should 
have paid. The Second Circuit drew upon Campbell once again as 
support for its view that “a publisher’s willingness to pay license fees for 
was hoping the court would give a narrow interpretation to Campbell such that a failure to comment 
on the original and the copying of entire works would tilt against fair use. Bill Graham Archives, 
448 F.3d at 609, 613. 
73. Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 608–09 (citing Leval, supra note 23, at 1111; Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 579). 
74. Id. at 609. 
75. Id. at 612 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586). 
76. Id. at 613 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 614. 
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reproduction of images does not establish that the publisher may not, in 
the alternative, make fair use of those images.”79 In addition, the Second 
Circuit endorsed the view, which seems quite consistent with Campbell, 
that copyright owners do not have the right to monopolize 
transformative use markets.80 
It is, of course, one thing to say that Campbell supports fair use 
defenses in cases involving quotations in non-fiction works and 
productive uses for context-setting purposes. It is quite another to affirm 
as fair the use of another’s work as raw material for appropriation art 
creations. It is worth noting that prior to Campbell, the Second Circuit 
had been quite hostile to fair use claims in appropriation art cases.81 
However, after Campbell, the Second Circuit changed its tune. 
In Blanch v. Koons,82 a graphic artist made extensive use of a 
photograph of a model’s legs from a commercial advertisement he found 
in a magazine. Koons scanned the image into a computer and 
manipulated it to incorporate it into a large canvas, which he sold to a 
German bank for hundreds of thousands of dollars.83 Although the final 
product reproduced much of the photograph, the Second Circuit had no 
difficulty deciding that Koons had made a transformative use of 
Blanch’s photo. Indeed, it stated that Campbell’s definition of 
transformativeness 
almost perfectly describes Koons’s adaptation of “Silk Sandals”: 
the use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a 
glossy American “lifestyles” magazine—with changes of its 
colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the 
medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ details and, 
crucially, their entirely different purpose and meaning—as part 
of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German 
art-gallery space.84 
Even though Koons’ use was seemingly more satirical than parodic—
a distinction that Campbell had deemed significant, saying that satires 
were less justified than parodies in their appropriations—the Second 
Circuit, under the influence of Campbell, found Koons’ substantial 
79. Id. at 615 (stating that “being denied permission to use [or pay license fees for] a work does 
not weigh against a finding of fair use” (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18)). 
80. Id.  
81. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
82. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
83. Id. at 247–48. 
84. Id. at 253. 
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appropriation of images from Blanch’s work qualified as fair.85 
An even more striking Second Circuit appropriation art case, Cariou 
v. Prince,86 has generated much controversy.87 A well-known 
appropriation artist, Richard Prince, bought books of photographs taken 
by Patrick Cariou of Rastafarians and Jamaican landscapes in which they 
live. Prince used the photographs as raw materials for a series of 
paintings he designated as his Canal Zone paintings. The Gagosian 
gallery sold several of them for millions of dollars. Cariou sued for 
copyright infringement.88 
In the District Court, Cariou scored a big victory.89 Not only were 
Prince and Gagosian held liable for infringement of Cariou’s derivative 
work right,90 but the District Court ordered that the infringing paintings 
be impounded and destroyed.91 In addition, Prince and Gagosian were 
ordered to notify owners of Canal Zone paintings that they would be 
liable for infringement if they tried to publicly display the paintings.92 
Although Prince’s lawyers argued that he had a transformative 
purpose in creating these paintings, the District Court rejected this 
argument because Prince’s deposition testimony indicated that he was 
not trying to comment on Cariou’s work.93 The court granted summary 
judgment to Cariou, concluding that Prince had taken too much of these 
highly artistic photographs. It also found that the market for Cariou’s 
work had been harmed, because a gallery owner withdrew an expression 
of interest in a show of Cariou’s work after learning of Prince’s Canal 
85. Id. at 254–55. 
86. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
87. See, e.g., Kim J. Landsman, Does Cariou v. Prince Represent the Apogee or Burn-Out of 
Transformativeness in Fair Use Jurisprudence? A Plea for a Neo-Traditional Approach, 24 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 321 (2014). Jane Ginsburg has criticized Cariou as 
“the boldest and most disturbing apparition of ‘transformativeness.’” Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from 
the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain Compliance with International Norms –Part II 
(Fair Use), REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR (forthcoming Jan. 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539178. 
88. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698–99, 709. 
89. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 355–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
90. Id. at 354. 
91. Id. at 355. 
92. Id. at 356. 
93. Id. at 348–49. The District Court also emphasized the commerciality of Prince’s use of the 
Cariou photographs and regarded his use of the photographs as having been done in bad faith. Id. at 
349–51. The Second Circuit did not address the bad faith issue, perhaps because of Campbell’s 
directive that good or bad faith is irrelevant to fair use determinations. 
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Zone series.94 
The Second Circuit had a strikingly different view of the Cariou case 
than the District Court. At the oral argument, one of the judges likened 
the District Court’s order to destroy Prince’s art to “something that 
would appeal to the Huns or the Taliban.”95 Unlike the District Court, 
the Second Circuit found Prince’s work to be transformative, saying that 
the District Court had an unduly narrow view of transformativeness: 
[O]ur observation of Prince’s artworks themselves convinces us 
of the transformative nature of all but five . . . . Prince’s 
artworks manifest an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s 
photographs. Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed 
portraits and landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of 
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s crude and 
jarring works . . . are hectic and provocative . . . . Prince has 
created collages on canvas that incorporate color, feature 
distorted human and other forms and settings, and measure 
between ten and nearly a hundred times the size of the 
photographs. Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color 
palette, and media are fundamentally different and new 
compared to the photographs, as is the expressive nature of 
Prince’s work.96 
The artist’s intent was not dispositive on the transformativeness inquiry, 
said the Second Circuit. The question was what a reasonable observer 
would perceive: was there a different message or meaning? If yes, then 
the work was transformative.97 
As in Blanch v. Koons, the other fair use factors in Cariou were 
mitigated once the court accepted the transformativeness of Prince’s 
purpose. Cariou and Prince were operating in entirely different markets, 
their works appealed to very different audiences, and in any event, 
Cariou would never have licensed the derivative uses that Prince had 
made of Cariou’s photographs.98 The case was remanded for further 
proceedings as to five of the Canal Zone series, and the parties settled 
after Cariou failed to persuade the Supreme Court to review the Second 
94. Id. at 348–54. 
95. See, e.g., Brian Boucher, Injunction in Prince v. Cariou Compared to Taliban in Appeal, ART 
IN AM. (May 21, 2012), http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/price-cariou-
oral-arguments/. 
96. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2013). 
97. Id. at 707. 
98. Id. at 709. 
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Circuit’s ruling.99 
Blanch and Cariou were transformative use cases in at least one 
conventional way: in each, the defendant created a second work that 
used portions of the plaintiffs’ works and seemed fair uses because they 
allowed the breathing room for ongoing creativity that Campbell 
endorsed. But can a use be considered transformative if no second work 
has been created? 
The short answer in the post-Campbell case law is yes. There have 
been a significant number of fair use cases in recent years in which 
differences between the purpose of the original work and the purpose of 
the use made by a putative fair user have been treated as transformative, 
even if the defendant was a commercial entity that made exact copies of 
the plaintiff’s works.100 Not all different purpose fair use defenses have 
succeeded, however.101 
One successful different purpose case was American Institute of 
Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.102 There, a District 
Court found that patent lawyers had made fair uses of scientific and 
technical journal articles when copying and distributing the copies 
within the law firm (and to clients) for purposes of assessing the prior art 
in connection with drawing up patent applications for the clients.103 The 
lawyers made exact copies of whole articles, and they charged clients for 
the work they did in analyzing the prior art.104 The publishers argued 
that they were suffering market harm because the Copyright Clearance 
Center (CCC) could provide a reasonable licensing market for patent 
lawyers’ uses of such articles.105 Prior to Campbell, such a use might 
99. Id. at 699, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013); Randy Kennedy, Richard Prince Settles Suit 
Over Photos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2014, at C3. Judge Wallace wrote a partial concurrence, partial 
dissent in Cariou which questioned the majority’s distinction between the twenty-five paintings it 
held to be fair use as a matter of law and the five that it remanded. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713–14 
(Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Amy Adler, The Meaning of 
“Transformative” and the Transformation of Meaning (manuscript on file with the author).  
100. See infra Part II.C. 
101. See, e.g., Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012) (use of nude photos in magazine 
not transformative); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012) (secret 
celebrity wedding photos in gossip magazine not transformative); Associated Press v. Meltwater 
U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (excerpts of articles in news service 
search results not transformative). 
102. No. 12-528 (RHK/JJK), 2013 WL 4666330 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2013). 
103. Id. at *18; accord Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 
6242843, at *2, *13 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013); see also White v. West Publ’g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 
396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (fair use for West to upload lawyers’ briefs to the Westlaw database and make 
the briefs available for its customers to download). 
104. Schwegman, 2013 WL 4666330, at *10–12. 
105. Id. at *5, *14. 
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well have been held unfair.106 
The court in Schwegman took note of the differences between the 
purpose of the original and the defendant’s purpose, observing that 
scientific authors had not written the articles and the publishers hadn’t 
distributed them “for the purpose of ensuring that a government agency 
is provided with the information it needs to determine whether an 
invention is novel or non-obvious.”107 The difference in purposes 
mattered for the court’s fair use analysis.108 
In keeping with Campbell, the court weighed the purpose in relation 
to the harm factor. The publishers, the court noted, had produced 
no evidence that the patent lawyers’ use of the scientific Articles 
to meet their obligations to disclose prior art to the [U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO)] adversely affects the traditional 
target market for these Articles, i.e., academics, physical 
scientists and researchers, engineers, educators, students, and 
members of the general public who want to read peer-reviewed 
scholarly, highly specialized articles about the physical sciences 
and other scientific disciplines.109 
It did not matter to the court that licenses were available or that some 
law firms had taken licenses.110 Calling upon the Bill Graham Archives 
case for support, the court ruled that the Schwegman firm had made fair 
uses of the articles.111 
Schwegman is a far cry from the parody in Campbell, but not perhaps 
as far a cry as the set of recent cases involving search engines that 
copied hundreds of thousands or even millions of works for purposes of 
indexing their contents and enabling search inquiries to be run against 
that index. The Second and Ninth Circuits have decided such uses are 
not only fair, but also transformative, as illustrated by the next three 
106. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (making 
archival copies of scientific and technical articles for researchers held unfair, largely because CCC 
was offering licenses for this use). 
107. 2013 WL 4666330, at *10.  
108. The difference in purpose, the court concluded, “weighs heavily in favor” of fair use, 
although it recognized that the “lack of alteration may make the label ‘transformative use’ a messy 
fit for Schwegman’s use.” Id. at *10–11. The companion decision to Schwegman in Winstead spoke 
of that law firm’s use as “transformative as evidence supporting a quasi-judicial decision.” 
Winstead, 2013 WL 6242843, at *5. 
109. Schwegman, 2013 WL 4666330, at *14. 
110. Id.  
111. Id. at *14–19. The court distinguished Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, because the research scientist in 
Texaco was using the articles for the same purpose as that for which they were written and 
published. Schwegman, 2013 WL 4666330, at *15. 
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cases.112 
The Ninth Circuit initiated this line of cases in Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp.113 Kelly, a photographer who displayed some images on his 
website, sued Arriba Soft for copyright infringement because it had 
copied and was publicly displaying thumbnail-sized images of Kelly’s 
photographs via its search engine.114 Before Campbell, this infringement 
claim might have been plausible because the copying could have been 
said to be a commercial iterative copying of the whole of an artistic 
work; that Kelly wanted to license Arriba’s use might have been given 
some weight as well. 
Yet, relying on Campbell and some of its progeny, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld Arriba’s fair use defense. “Arriba’s use of the images serves a 
different function than Kelly’s use—improving access to information on 
the internet versus artistic expression.”115 Because the thumbnails were 
small, low-resolution images, they were unlikely to supersede the market 
for Kelly’s work. The Ninth Circuit took into account the public benefit 
of Arriba’s use of Kelly’s works, as well as the likely benefit for Kelly 
insofar as Arriba’s thumbnails helped users find his website.116 Four 
years later, in Perfect10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,117 the Ninth Circuit 
characterized another search engine’s display of thumbnail images as 
“highly transformative”118 and further emphasized the public benefit that 
search engines provide in support of its fair use ruling, with references to 
Campbell sprinkled throughout the court’s analysis.119 
Perhaps the most significant of the different purpose fair use cases is 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust.120 The Authors Guild, some 
112. See also A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms LLC, 560 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (fair use 
to create searchable database of student papers to detect plagiarism).  
113. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). June Besek has criticized the search engine cases as “radical.” 
Besek Testimony, supra note 4, at 1–7. 
114. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815. 
115. Id. at 819. 
116. Id. at 820–22. 
117. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
118. Id. at 1165.  
119. Id. (“[A] search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new 
work, namely, an electronic reference tool. Indeed, a search engine may be more transformative 
than a parody because a search engine provides an entirely new use for the original work.”). The 
opinion cites to Campbell fifteen times. 
120. 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). June Besek and Jane Ginsburg have been critical of the 
HathiTrust decision. Besek Testimony, supra note 4, at 18; Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 16–19. 
Currently pending before the Second Circuit is an appeal, No. 13-4829-cv (2d Cir.) (argued Dec. 3, 
2014), of Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), a related case 
which challenges Google’s scanning of millions of books for its Google Book Search project and 
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individual authors, and non-U.S. authors organizations sued HathiTrust 
and several of its public university partners for copyright infringement 
because HathiTrust had created a database of ten million books, of 
which perhaps up to seven million were in-copyright, from digitized 
copies of books from research library collections.121 HathiTrust claimed 
fair use because the database was a full-text searchable information 
resource that allowed patrons to find books relevant to their research 
projects, because the database preserved books in partner institutions’ 
collections, and because it used the database to make books accessible to 
print-disabled people.122 
The Authors Guild challenged the lower court’s characterization of 
the purpose of HathiTrust’s use as transformative, pointing out that the 
HathiTrust corpus contained exact copies of the books and no new work 
had been created to justify the use, as in Campbell.123 Although 
HathiTrust was a nonprofit entity, the Authors Guild argued that there 
was commerciality in its use because HathiTrust had swapped letting 
Google scan books from research library collections for a copy of the 
database of books that it scanned.124 The Guild made much of two 
specific HathiTrust uses of the books in arguing, first, that HathiTrust’s 
preservation copying unfairly exceeded the library privilege Congress 
had created in § 108 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”), and, 
second, that HathiTrust’s provision of access for print-disabled patrons 
went too far beyond what § 121 allows.125 All of the Authors Guild’s 
arguments on the purpose factor were unavailing. 
The Second Circuit characterized the creation of a full-text searchable 
database as “a quintessentially transformative use,” because it enabled 
word searches that yielded information about which books contained the 
sought-after information and on what page the references were to be 
indexing their contents to serve up some snippets in response to user search queries. The District 
Court ruled that Google’s use was fair. Authors Guild v. Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 293-94. 
121. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
122. Id. 
123. See Final Form Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 31–34, HathiTrust, 
755 F.3d 87 (No.12-4547-cv). 
124. Id. at 25–26. 
125. See id. at 18–22; 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 121 (2012). June Besek has criticized the HathiTrust 
decision for finding fair use despite the more limited privileges that §§ 108 and 121 provide. Besek 
Testimony, supra note 4, at 20–21. However, § 108(f)(4) specifically preserves the right of libraries 
to rely on fair use. Moreover, the legislative history of the 1976 Act gives enabling access to print-
disabled persons as an example of a use that should be fair. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 73 (1976). 
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found.126 This was a very different purpose than authors had in mind 
when they wrote their books. Drawing upon Campbell’s formulation of 
transformation, the court noted that “by enabling full-text search, the 
[HathiTrust Digital Library (HDL)] adds to the original something new 
with a different purpose and a different character.”127 
The Second Circuit disagreed with the District Court, though, on the 
purpose factor in relation to providing access to works for print-disabled 
patrons. The lower court had considered the print-disabled purpose as 
transformative because the works were being made available in a 
different format (e.g., Braille) than the original.128 The Second Circuit 
regarded this use as non-transformative,129 but went on to find the use 
fair nonetheless.130 
The Second Circuit regarded the copying of the books to be 
reasonably necessary to carry out the search and enhance print-disabled 
access functions.131 It was unpersuaded by the Guild’s licensing 
arguments and assertions of other types of harms.132 The most important 
point was that 
full-text search function does not serve as a substitute for the 
books that are being searched. Thus, it is irrelevant that the 
Libraries might be willing to purchase licenses in order to 
engage in this transformative use (if the use were deemed 
unfair). Lost licensing revenue counts under Factor Four only 
when the use serves as a substitute for the original and the full-
text-search use does not.133 
The nature of the work factor was in HathiTrust, as in so many other 
cases, given little weight. The Second Circuit decided that on balance 
126. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97. 
127. Id. 
128. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
129. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 101–02. The Authors Guild had claimed that the transformed format 
of the works was an unlawful derivative work. Id. The Second Circuit rejected that argument. Id.; 
see also Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(nontransformative commercial use of contents of telephone call as news was fair use). 
130. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 101–02. Legislative history of the 1976 Act and the purposes 
underlying the American Disabilities Act supported the positive valence of the purpose of the use, 
even though it was non-transformative. Id. at 102.  
131. Id. at 98–99, 103–04. 
132. Id. at 99–100. The Guild made much of the risk of a security breach that might cause 
millions of books to be released onto the Internet. The Second Circuit was unimpressed. 
133. Id. at 100 (citations omitted) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
591–92 (1994); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 
2006)). 
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HathiTrust’s uses were fair.134 
There are at least five notable things about the HathiTrust ruling. 
First, the court viewed the full-text search use as transformative because 
it considered the HathiTrust database itself as a new work that had a 
different purpose than the books in it.135 Second, the court accepted the 
Guild’s argument that improving access to print-disabled persons was a 
non-transformative use; yet, it went on to find the use fair anyway.136 
Third, the court thought so little of the Guild’s beyond-the-library-
privilege argument that it consigned the point to a footnote, and it did 
not even mention the beyond-the-statutory-exception-for-print-disabled 
argument.137 Fourth, the court focused the harm analysis as to the 
transformative use on whether the use supplanted demand for the 
original, and if not, that factor tipped in favor of fairness.138 Fifth, the 
scale and scope of copying in the HathiTrust case was beyond what had 
been deemed fair in other cases.139 The Second Circuit has opened the 
door to mass digitization, at least by libraries, insofar as this will further 
the progress of science. The Second Circuit called upon Campbell 
numerous times in the HathiTrust opinion,140 but took fair use in some 
new directions in that ruling. 
Campbell has understandably had considerable salience in 
transformative use cases. Yet courts have sometimes relied heavily upon 
it in non-transformative work cases. In Cambridge University Press v. 
Patton,141 for instance, the Eleventh Circuit repeatedly drew upon 
Campbell for a substantial number of propositions: that fair use 
“critically limits the scope” of copyright “in order to promote the public 
134. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 105 (finding creation of a full-text searchable database and disabled-
access format to be fair use). However, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the lower court 
ruling of fair use as to digitizing works for the purpose of preservation. Id. The parties then settled. 
See, e.g., Krista Cox, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust Litigation Ends in Victory for Fair Use, ASS’N OF 
RES. LIBRARIES (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.arl.org/news/community-updates/3501-authors-guild-v-
hathitrust-litigation-ends-in-victory-for-fair-use#.VQ2Qr-Fmppk. 
135. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97. 
136. Id. at 101–02. 
137. Id. at 94 n.4, 103 n.7. 
138. Id. at 96–97. 
139. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
making eight archival copies of scientific and technical articles for future reference by a Texaco 
researcher was unfair). 
140. Campbell is cited and/or quoted fourteen times in the Second Circuit’s HathiTrust opinion. 
141. 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit cited to Campbell fifteen times in its 
Patton opinion. The Patton decision is yet another that Jane Ginsburg has criticized as insufficiently 
attentive to harm to potential licensing markets. Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 5–9. 
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benefit”;142 that fair use provides “breathing space” and “avoid[s] rigid 
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the 
very creativity which that law is designed to foster”;143 that courts 
should not adopt “hard evidentiary presumption[s]” in fair use cases;144 
that fair use is to be judged case-by-case with a sensitive balancing of 
interests;145 and that fair use factors must be weighed together and 
weighed in relation to one another,146 just to name a few. 
Cambridge University Press (CUP) challenged the electronic course 
reserves policy of Georgia State University (GSU), under which many 
faculty members had posted digital copies of book chapters on the 
library servers or on course management sites to make the chapters 
accessible to their students. Professors routinely filled out fair use 
checklists before putting these chapters online. After a trial on the 
merits, a District Court decided that all but five of the seventy-five 
challenged uses of the plaintiffs’ books were fair.147 CUP appealed, and 
although it prevailed in the appeal, it did not attain as strong a victory as 
it had hoped.148 Campbell seems to have played at least some role in 
CUP’s narrower win.149 
The Eleventh Circuit accepted that posting exact copies of book 
chapters generally served non-transformative purposes, although 
interestingly it recognized the possibility that some of the excerpts could 
serve transformative purposes (e.g., teaching about the civil rights 
movement by examining materials written by racists).150 The non-
142. Patton, 769 F.3d at 1257 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 
(1994)). 
143. Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 577). 
144. Id. at 1261 (alteration in original) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584). 
145. Id. at 1259 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577). 
146. Id. at 1260 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578, 586). 
147. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014), rev’g Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012). The district court ruled that instances 
in which a digital license was readily available for an excerpt weighed in favor of the publishers. 
Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
148. Andrew Albanese, Appeals Court Reverses GSU Copyright Ruling, PUBLISHERS WKLY. 
(Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/copyright/article/64454-
appeals-court-reverses-gsu-copyright-ruling.html. 
149. The plaintiff-publishers relied on earlier case law that had ruled unfair the copying of book 
chapters and articles by commercial copy-shops for hard-copy student course-packs because ready 
licensing markets existed. See Patton, 769 F.3d at 1260–61 (citing Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s 
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. 
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc)); id. at 1276–77 (citing Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929, 931 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
150. Patton, 769 F.3d at 1263 n.21. 
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transformative character of the uses, however, did not weigh against fair 
use as much as CUP expected. The nonprofit educational purpose was 
“sufficiently weighty” to overcome the non-transformative character of 
the use.151 The court noted that “multiple copies for classroom use” is 
specifically identified in the statute as one that may qualify for fair 
use.152 
On two grounds, however, the Eleventh Circuit took issue with the 
District Court’s fair use analysis. The District Court had been too quick 
to regard the informational nature of the works posted online for 
students as weighing, across the board, in favor of fair use.153 The 
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration of the nature of 
the work factor because it was possible that at least some of the posted 
materials were “evaluative, analytical, or subjectively descriptive” and 
assigned for their expressive value.154 
The Eleventh Circuit also decided that the District Court’s “blanket 
10 percent-or-one-chapter benchmark [for the amount-taken fair use 
factor] was improper”155 because it was inconsistent with Campbell’s 
critique of hard evidentiary presumptions in fair use cases.156 The 
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration so that the 
amount taken would be judged individually rather than by a blanket rule. 
The question for each excerpt would be whether the amount copied was 
“excessive in relation to Defendants’ pedagogical purpose of the work,” 
taking into account the quantity and quality of the materials.157 
Campbell’s nuanced approach to the amount factor was evident in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s fair use assessment. 
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that non-transformative character of 
the online course materials made “the threat of market 
substitution . . . great,” again with a tip of the hat to Campbell.158 The 
harm factor had, however, to be considered in relation to the other 
factors, as Campbell directed. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the 
District Court that “the small excerpts Defendants used do not substitute 
151. Id. at 1267. 
152. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012)). The court further noted that Campbell had recognized 
this type of non-transformative use as possibly fair. Id. at 1263. 
153. Id. at 1269–70. 
154. Id. at 1270. 
155. Id. at 1271. 
156. Id. at 1272. 
157. Id. at 1275. 
158. Id.  
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for the full books from which they were drawn.”159 CUP argued that the 
willingness of the CCC to develop licenses for online course materials, 
as it had done for coursepacks, meant that the unlicensed use of these 
materials was causing harm to the plaintiffs’ markets for these works. 
However, the Eleventh Circuit took a more nuanced view of the harm 
issue: that CUP would suffer some loss of revenue was not sufficient. 
The question instead was whether the defendants’ use “would cause 
substantial economic harm such that allowing it would frustrate the 
purposes of copyright by materially impairing . . . incentive[s] to publish 
the work.”160 The Eleventh Circuit deferred to the District Court’s 
finding that licenses were unavailable for many of the excerpts as a 
factor undercutting CUP’s market harm argument.161 The court 
nevertheless remanded for further consideration of the market harm 
factor in relation to the other factors. 
In sum, Campbell has had transformative impacts on the fair use case 
law in numerous ways: by repudiating the dual negative presumptions 
from Sony; directing courts to weigh factors more sensitively, both 
internally and in relation to the other factors; appreciating the creativity 
of many secondary uses of copyrighted materials; endorsing the role of 
fair use in providing breathing space for second comers’ creativity; 
recognizing that uses of works for different purposes than the original 
might qualify as fair; and focusing attention on market substitution as 
the harm that copyright law cares about. 
II. HAS FAIR USE GONE TOO FAR? 
Part I has shown how influential Campbell has been in the fair use 
case law of the past two decades. Many commentators seem satisfied 
with its impacts on fair use law and jurisprudence.162 Let’s count them as 
supporters of the post-Campbell status quo. While the status quo 
commentators are numerous, there are some commentators who think 
that Campbell or some of its progeny do not go far enough.163 They want 
fair use to expand further to protect interests they regard as in need of 
this doctrine’s protection. Let’s call these commentators the status-quo-
plus group. We will visit in Part III some new horizons into which they 
159. Id. at 1276. 
160. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
161. Id. at 1278–82. 
162. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3. 
163. See, e.g., Amy Adler, supra note 99; John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of 
Natural Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 497–99 (2005); Tushnet, supra note 58. 
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and others think that fair use should expand and play important roles. 
There is, however, a vocal group of critics who think fair use has 
gone too far. They have raised three principal challenges to the post-
Campbell fair use case law: that courts have been too quick to treat the 
copying of the whole of copyrighted works as fair uses; that copying for 
a different purpose than the author of a protected work had at the time of 
creation or dissemination should not be considered transformative; and 
that fair use rulings as to transformative uses of expression in 
copyrighted works are undermining the derivative work right.164  These 
critics are urging the courts, Congress, and seemingly the World Trade 
Organization to cut back on U.S. fair use law.165 
The principal purpose of this Part is to respond to those who argue for 
a substantial curtailment of the fair use defense in the post-Campbell 
era.166 Section A explains why criticisms of the whole-work-fair-use 
copy cases are unpersuasive. Section B addresses the perceived conflict 
between the transformation-of-expression fair use cases and the 
derivative work right. Section C considers criticisms of the different 
purpose cases. Section D responds to the charge that fair use has gone so 
far that the U.S. is in violation of its obligations under international 
treaties and trade agreements. 
A. Faulting Sony for the Whole Work Fair Use Cases 
Campbell itself has not been the target of the fair-use-has-gone-too-
far critics. It is, after all, a relatively conventional case involving the 
creation of a new work that appropriated some parts of a preexisting 
work in a manner that can reasonably be construed as a critical 
commentary on the original. 
Sony v. Universal is the Supreme Court decision that the gone-too-far 
164. See, e.g., Besek Testimony, supra note 4; Ginsburg, supra note 87; Paul Goldstein, Fair Use 
in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 442 (2008). See also other critiques cited in Jessica 
Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651 (2015). Besek has also complained that 
fair use is “swallowing” up specific copyright exceptions. Besek Testimony, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
I addressed that critique in Samuelson, infra note 248. 
165. See, e.g., Besek Testimony, supra note 4, at 12–14; Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 13–14. 
166. Although the gone-too-far commentators have criticized the CUP v. Patton decision, see, 
e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 5–9, I have not addressed that critique in this Part for a few 
reasons. First, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling, and remanded for further 
proceedings, so we really do not know which uses will ultimately be deemed fair or unfair. Second, 
the fact that the publishers would have preferred a bigger win is not a basis for claiming that fair use 
has gone too far. Third, despite the many citations to Campbell in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, 
that non-transformative use case is not as central a part of Campbell’s legacy as the cases defended 
in this Part. Sony is a more closely analogous case, as it also involved non-transformative copying. 
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critics typically regard as the one that caused fair use to go off the 
rails.167 It is true, as they claim, that before Sony, it was rare for courts to 
say that copying the whole of a protected work could be a fair use.168 
And it is true that in recent decades, as Professor Reese has shown in his 
symposium contribution, courts have found fair use in several cases 
involving whole work copies.169 The search engine cases, along with 
some recent cases that have ruled copying broadcast programs were fair 
use170—of which the critics also disapprove171—owe a much bigger debt 
to Sony than to Campbell. 
The attack on Sony is, however, misguided for several reasons. For 
one thing, the Latman fair use study that informed the Register’s 
recommended codification of fair use identified private and personal use 
copies as among the uses that might find shelter under the codified fair 
use umbrella,172 so while it may be true that few fair use cases had 
recognized whole copies as fair, that does not mean no one had 
contemplated that whole copies might sometimes be fair. As Professor 
Litman explains in her contribution to this symposium, there is 
considerable evidence in the legislative history of U.S. copyright laws 
that Congress did not intend to regulate personal use copies.173 
The Latman study also contemplated that whole work copies might be 
fair in litigation and judicial proceedings.174 The House Report 
accompanying the 1976 Act also gave several examples of whole work 
fair use copies, such as those that would preserve motion pictures or 
provide special format copies for the blind.175 
Moreover, three of the six favored uses in the codified statute—
teaching, research, and scholarship—contemplate at least some whole 
167. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free or Permitted-But-Paid, 29 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1383, 1383 (2014). 
168. Id. 
169. Reese, supra note 38. 
170. Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) (time- and 
space-shifting); Fox News Network LLC v. TV Eyes, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(news aggregation database service). 
171. See, e.g., Besek Testimony, supra note 4, at 17 (criticizing the Perfect10 v. Amazon.com 
decision as a “radical shift” in fair use law); Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 13–15 (criticizing Fox v. 
Dish); Ginsburg, supra note 167, at 1413 (giving the search engine cases as examples of uses that 
should perhaps be permitted, but only if subject to compensation). 
172. ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 11 (1958), reprinted in STUDIES 
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, S. JUDICIARY COMM., 
81ST CONG., COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY NO. 14, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (Comm. Print 1960).  
173. Litman, supra note 164. 
174. LATMAN, supra note 172, at 13–14. 
175. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 73 (1976). 
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work copies, and the statute even contemplates multiple copies for 
classroom use as potentially fair.176  In addition, Congress codified a 
privilege for libraries to make whole work copies of journal articles for 
patrons,177 the very issue on which the Court had evenly split in the 
Williams & Wilkins v. United States fair use case.178 Thus, there is 
considerable evidence that Congress contemplated that the copying of 
the whole of copyrighted works could be fair use, evidence that the 
critics of Sony ignore. 
Although the Supreme Court was deeply split in Sony on whether 
time-shifting was fair use, twenty-one years later the Court was 
unanimous in regarding time-shifting as fair use; indeed, the Court 
seemed to think that copying programs to store them for personal use 
might well be fair.179 The Court was, however, mindful in Sony of the 
possibility that the copying of whole works could be harmful. To ensure 
Sony would not be too broadly construed, the Court directed that 
consideration be given to the market impact if the challenged use 
became widespread.180  This recognized that if a court ruled a particular 
use by this defendant was fair, it would set a precedent on which others 
could rely. Thus, even though that one defendant’s use might not cause 
meaningful harm to the market, the same or similar uses by hundreds, 
thousands, or even millions of people might cause such harm, and that 
would tip an individually minimal harm use into a harmful one as to the 
multitudes. This check was important in some post-Campbell peer-to-
peer file-sharing and news clipping cases.181 The Court in Sony sought to 
craft a careful balance between the interests of rights holders in 
controlling harmful uses of their works and the interests of users of 
copyrighted works in harmless activities. 
The Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust decision is another of the whole 
176. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
177. Id. § 108(a). 
178. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
179. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931 (2005). 
180. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
181. BMG Music, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); Associated Press v. Meltwater, 
931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The directive in Sony to consider the potential harm to the 
market if the use became widespread serves as an important built-in check on the scope of fair use 
that should preserve it against those who claim that Sony is among the cases that puts the U.S. out of 
compliance with its treaty obligations. But see, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 164, at 442 (claiming that 
the fair use analyses in the Sony, Bill Graham Archives, and Perfect 10 cases violate the Berne 
Convention’s minimum standards). For more discussion of the treaty compliance issue, see infra 
Part II.D. 
 
                                                     
13 - Samuelson.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:31 PM 
2015] POSSIBLE FUTURES OF FAIR USE 843 
work copy cases that has been criticized as going too far.182 That Second 
Circuit decision may have cited more prolifically to Campbell than to 
Sony, but Sony seems to be the more relevant holding. Still, the indexing 
in that case was no more infringement than was the indexing in the New 
York Times v. Roxbury Data Interface case from the 1970s.183 The 
preservation and print-disabled access functions of the HathiTrust 
database seem consistent with the preservation and print-disabled access 
that the House Report contemplated as fair uses.184 And because 
HathiTrust does not display any contents of the in-copyright books in its 
corpus (except to those who have been certified as print-disabled), the 
risk of supplanting demand for the original is non-existent.185 
In sum, the criticisms of Sony and Campbell for permitting whole-
work-copies as fair uses are misguided because Congress contemplated 
that such uses might be fair, because Sony directed courts to consider the 
potential for harm if small uses became widespread, and because 
Campbell provided that the amount copied must be reasonable in light of 
the defendant’s purpose, which also serves as a meaningful check on the 
scope of fair use. 
B. Transformation of Expression Cases 
Of the recent transformation-of-expression fair use cases, only Cariou 
v. Prince has been singled out for censure.186 The main critique lodged 
against that decision has been that it undermines the exclusive right of 
authors to make derivative works. Judge Easterbrook, for instance, took 
a swipe at Cariou in a recent decision in another transformation-of-
expression case, saying that he was skeptical of the approach in Cariou 
“because asking exclusively whether something is ‘transformative’ not 
only replaces the list in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(2), which protects derivative works.”187 Yet, his Kienitz decision 
ultimately affirmed a lower court ruling that Sconnie Nation had made 
182. See, e.g., Besek Testimony, supra note 4, at 10–11; Ginsburg, supra note 167, at 1398.  
183. 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977). 
184. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
185. A prominent economist prepared an expert report to explain why a viable market for the uses 
that HathiTrust was making of in-copyright books would be unlikely to form. Declaration of Joel 
Waldfogel in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Authors Guild Inc. v. 
HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 6351), available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2011cv06351/384619/108 
[hereinafter Waldfogel Declaration]. 
186. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 19. 
187. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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fair use of Kienitz’ photograph of the mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, by 
creating a colorful version for a protest t-shirt that mocked the mayor for 
trying to shut down a street fair.188 
It is notable that both the Cariou and Kienitz cases involved 
commercial uses of transformed-expression that posed zero risk of 
supplanting demand for the plaintiffs’ original works. Both cases, 
moreover, involved transformations that the plaintiffs would have been 
unwilling to license. The Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou might 
have been somewhat more persuasive had the court observed that the 
photographer’s objections to Prince’s uses of his work were implicitly 
moral rights objections, which Congress had decided not to extend to the 
photographs published in Cariou’s books.189 There was, in addition, a 
moral rights element in the Kienitz case that also tipped in favor of fair 
use. Kienitz may have wanted to assure clients that he would not license 
disrespectful uses of his photographs,190 but the clients’ and his interests 
in avoiding critical comment are not cognizable under U.S. law. In these 
respects, the Cariou and Kienitz cases seem consistent with Campbell. 
And it is also worth noting that the Supreme Court was not so outraged 
by the Cariou decision as to grant the photographer’s petition for 
certiorari.191 
Although critics of the transformed-expression cases seem to think 
that the cases ride roughshod over the derivative work right, the post-
Campbell case law, when viewed more closely and holistically, suggests 
otherwise. For example, plaintiffs won two recent cases involving 
photographs of the musician Sid Vicious that defendants transformed 
into colorful paintings, which the courts ruled were unfair, perhaps 
because of their non-critical nature.192 In a third transformed-expression 
case, the defendant lost a summary judgment motion for creating a 
montage of two photographs—the iconic photograph of the planting of a 
flag at Iwo Jima with another photograph of the hoisting of a flag at the 
ruins of the World Trade Center—that was posted on a Facebook 
page.193 These cases are consistent with Professor Reese’s findings some 
years ago that transformative purpose cases were not, contrary to some 
188. Id. at 757, 759–60. 
189. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) (2012). 
190. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759–60.  
191. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
192. Morris v. Guetta, No. LA CV12-00684 JAK (RZx), 2013 WL 440127 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 
2013); Morris v. Young, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
193. North Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Pirro, No. 13 Civ. 7153, 2015 WL 542258 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
10, 2015). 
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expectations, undermining the derivative work right.194 
C. Different Purpose Fair Uses 
The critics of fair use object to the different purpose cases because 
they say that having a different purpose than the creator should not make 
uses fair if licensing markets are possible.195 They are correct in thinking 
that there have been quite a few different purpose cases in recent years. 
Indeed, sixteen of the fifty fair use cases decided in the past three years 
involved claims that the difference between the purpose of the original 
work and the purpose of the defendant’s use should weigh in favor of 
fair use.196 Each will be reviewed in this subsection. In most of these 
cases, the courts cited to Campbell in support of treating different 
purposes as transformative, even though the gone-too-far critics are 
correct that the ordinary meaning of “transformative” would not 
encompass the iterative copies made in those cases.197 Yet that does not 
mean that all of the defense wins in the different purpose cases were 
wrongly decided. 
Consider these seven cases. Lawyers who copied the CV of a 
prospective expert witness—who later became disgruntled because he 
was not actually hired as an expert—made fair use of the CV when 
distributing it to the court and opposing counsel in pre-trial 
proceedings.198  Officials of a state bar association prevailed in a fair use 
defense for copying portions of a lawyer’s blog to use in disciplinary 
proceedings against her.199 Use of excerpts from the plaintiff’s book in 
pleadings to support a harassment claim was similarly ruled fair use.200 
A blogger won a fair use defense for posting an unflattering photo of a 
businessman in connection with her extensive criticism of his business 
practices.201 eBay won a fair use defense to quash a photographer’s 
194. R. Anthony Reese, Transformative Use and The Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 467 (2008). 
195. See, e.g., Besek Testimony, supra note 4, at 5–9; Ginsburg, supra note 167, at 1385, 1413. 
196. See Appendix A for a complete listing of the fifty fair use cases decided in the past three 
years from the WestlawNext database covering the period March 2012 to March 2015. 
197. See infra Part III.A where I recommend removing the different purpose cases from the 
transformative category. I agree with Tushnet, supra note 3, that different purpose cases should 
often qualify as fair uses. 
198. Devil’s Advocate, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:13-cv-1246, 2014 WL 7238856 (E.D. 
Va. Dec. 16, 2014). 
199. Denison v. Larkin, No. 1:14-cv-01470, 2014 WL 3953637 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) 
200. Levington v. Earle, No. CV-12-08165-PCF-JAT, 2014 WL 1246369 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 
2014). 
201. Katz v. Chevaldina, No. 12-22211-CIV, 2014 WL 2815496 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2014), aff’d 
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claim of infringement based on user displays of images of his 
photographs when users were trying to resell magazines on whose front 
cover the photographs appeared.202 An architect made fair use of a 
sculpture when taking a photograph for his portfolio of an elaborate 
hallway he had designed for a condominium that included the plaintiff’s 
art glass creation.203 Sony won a fair use defense for using “the past is 
not even past” phrase from a Faulkner novel in its Midnight in Paris 
movie.204 
Plaintiffs won four cases in the past three years in which different 
purpose fair use defenses were mounted. A conservative group’s use of a 
photograph of a gay couple kissing for its political ads aimed at 
defeating pro-gay rights candidates in a Colorado election was held 
unfair.205 Hustler Magazine made unfair use of a photograph of a nearly 
nude former news anchor who got drunk at a beer bash for its “hot news 
babes” feature.206 A celebrity gossip magazine lost its fair use defense 
for publishing some wedding photos of a popular singer who had held 
herself out as a single person.207 A news clipping service made unfair 
use of AP news by copying too much, posing a risk of supplanting 
demand for the original.208 
The remaining five different purpose cases from the past three years 
& adopted by 2014 WL 4385690 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2014). The court took into account that the 
businessman had purchased the copyright so he could force the blogger to take down the photo. Id. 
at *1–2. 
202. Rosen v. eBay, No. CV 13-6801 MWF (Ex), 2015 WL 1600081 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015). 
203. Neri v. Monroe, 11-cv-429-slc, 2014 WL 793336 (W.D. Wisc. Feb. 25, 2014). 
204. Faulkner Literary Rights LLC v. Sony Picture Classics, 953 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Miss. 
2013). This would ordinarily be a productive use case, but the court treated it as a different purpose 
case. 
205. Hill v. Pub. Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Colo. 2014). The Hill plaintiffs 
lost their privacy claim because the court considered the photograph newsworthy. Id. at 1357. 
206. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012). Balsley purchased the copyright in the 
photos first published on a website so she could use the copyright to quash further dissemination of 
the photos. 
207. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). It was not at all clear that 
Monge actually owned copyrights in the photos as they were of her and her spouse which someone 
in her entourage probably took. I have elsewhere expressed some qualms about the Hill, Balsley, 
and Monge decisions because they seem to me to be cases in which copyright claims were being 
asserted to accomplish non-copyright objectives, such as privacy interests. See Pamela Samuelson, 
Protecting Privacy Through Copyright?, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE (Marc 
Rotenberg, ed., forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2435288.  
208. Associated Press v. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Meltwater relied on 
the search engine cases, but the court thought Meltwater’s use was not as different in purpose as the 
use in those cases. 
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are the controversial ones. Two are Google Book Search cases; two 
others are publisher lawsuits against patent lawyers for copying articles 
in preparation of patent applications; and the fifth is the failed class 
action lawsuit against West Publishing for uploading lawyers’ briefs to 
its Westlaw database.209 Because the Book Search and patent lawyer 
lawsuits pose virtually identical issues, there are only three controversial 
different purpose fair use cases. Even if they were wrongly decided—
which I don’t believe they were—they hardly demonstrate such an 
egregious extension of fair use as to trigger claims that the U.S. is out of 
compliance with its treaty obligations. 
Consider first the White v. West Publishing210 case. White filed a class 
action lawsuit against West and Reed Elsevier, owner of the Lexis 
database, asserting that these firms’ downloading of documents, 
including his and other lawyers’ briefs filed in court cases, from the 
federal court PACER site and uploading them into the legal databases 
constituted infringement.211 The District Court found the defendants’ 
purposes to be transformative for two reasons: first, because the database 
providers had a different purpose than White in making briefs part of its 
interactive legal research tools, and second, because the firms added 
something new by inserting codes and links to these legal documents.212 
The nature of the work was said to be the “functional presentations of 
fact and law” which also favored fair use.213 Whole briefs were copied, 
but this was necessary to make the briefs searchable.214  The briefs were 
“in no way economically a substitute for the use of the briefs in their 
original market.”215 There was, in the court’s view, no secondary market 
209. The Google Book Search cases are: Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), argued, No. 13-4829-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2014); and Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’g in part, vacating in part, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). The patent lawyer cases are: Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-
1230-M, 2013 WL 6242843 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) and Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, 
Lundberg, & Woessner, P.A., No. 12-528 (RHK/JJK), 2013 WL 4666330 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 
2013). The Westlaw database case is White v. West Publ’g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
210. 29 F. Supp. 3d 396. 
211. One problem for White’s class action was that very few U.S. lawyers have registered their 
briefs and other court documents with the Copyright Office. White, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 397. But it is 
also questionable whether White would or could adequately represent the interests of all lawyers 
who had filed documents with PACER since many of them might well find the availability of briefs 
on Westlaw and Lexis to be beneficial.  
212. Id. at 398. 
213. Id. at 399. 
214. Id.  
215. Id. at 400.  
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for the briefs, and White himself had never tried to license their use 
before bringing the lawsuit.216 The court also pointed to the 
“prohibitively high” transaction costs that a victory for White would 
entail.217 Such a ruling would also put lawyers at risk for making copies 
of other lawyers’ briefs to share with colleagues as well as public 
interest groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and 
journalistic enterprises, such as SCOTUSblog, for posting significant 
briefs online. The District Court’s decision in White seems quite sensible 
in light of these considerations.218 
Consider next the Winstead219 and Schwegman cases. The American 
Institute of Physics (AIP) sought to hold these law firms liable for 
copyright infringement because of copies their lawyers made of 
scientific and technical articles in connection with preparation of patent 
applications.220 A significant factor in both cases was that federal 
regulations require that patent lawyers submit copies of prior art 
documents so that patent examiners will have relevant information about 
the state of the art so they can make good judgments about whether the 
claimed inventions are novel and nonobvious.221 Initially, AIP claimed 
infringement for the copies submitted to the PTO, but later withdrew 
these claims, focusing only on the copying within the firms and with 
clients.222 The courts in both cases ultimately concluded that these 
copies too were made to comply with PTO requirements.223 The court in 
Schwegman likened these copies to fair use copies made of documents 
for litigation purposes, noting that the lawyers were indifferent to the 
expression in the articles, caring only about the facts and ideas they 
contained.224 The court in Winstead spoke of the public benefit of the 
lawyer copying as “minimiz[ing] excessive costs in patent applications 
and maximiz[ing] the accuracy of the patent process.”225 Given that 
many countries have specific exceptions for copying in connection with 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. White is not one of the decisions that the gone-too-far critics point to as a treaty violation. 
219. Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead, 3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 6242843 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 
2013). 
220. Id. at *1; Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A., CIV. 12-528 
RHK/JJK, 2013 WL 4666330, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2013).. 
221. Winstead, 2013 WL 6242843, at *1; Schwegman, 2013 WL 4666330, at *2–3. 
222. Winstead, 2013 WL 6242843, at *9; Schwegman, 2013 WL 4666330, at *7. 
223. Schwegman, 2013 WL 4666330, at *10. 
224. Id. at *11–12. 
225. 2013 WL 6242843, at *12. 
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administrative and judicial proceedings,226 it seems unlikely that the 
Schwegman and Winstead cases would put the U.S. out of compliance 
with treaty obligations. 
That leaves us with the Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google and HathiTrust 
decisions.227 One purpose of the copying in HathiTrust was to preserve 
books in research library collections.228 Other countries have copyright 
exceptions that allow libraries to make preservation copies of works in 
their collections.229 A second purpose of HathiTrust’s copying was to 
enhance access to books for print-disabled persons,230 which is also an 
internationally-recognized social norm.231 Both HathiTrust and Google 
use the corpus of books they possess for data-mining purposes,232 an 
activity for which some countries have adopted specific exceptions.233 
Because HathiTrust does not display the contents of in-copyright books 
to non-print-disabled patrons, there can be no harm to the market for 
these books. Although Google makes up to three snippets of book 
contents available in response to search queries, the snippets do not 
supplant demand for the books; indeed, they may whet users’ appetite 
for the books because Google provides a link to sources from which 
users can purchase the books. It is, moreover, unrealistic to expect a 
licensing market to develop for authorizing these very limited uses with 
owners of copyrights in millions of books.234 
This subsection has reviewed several types of different purpose fair 
use cases. In some, fair use defenses have failed, which shows that 
having a different purpose than the plaintiff is not a guarantee that a 
challenged use will be fair. Where different purpose defenses have 
succeeded, the risks that the defendants’ uses would supplant market 
226. See, e.g., Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, art. 5.3(e), 2001 O.J. (L 167) [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]. 
227. See supra notes 120–140 and accompanying text for further discussion of these two cases. 
228. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014). 
229. See, e.g., InfoSoc Directive, supra note 226, art. 5.2(c); Case C-117/13, Technische 
Universität Darmstadt v. Eugen Ulmer KG (2014) (university library could under EU member state 
law digitize books in their collections in keeping with the InfoSoc Directive). 
230. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 91. 
231. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 226, art. 5.3(b); Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to 
Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, rev. 
June 27, 2013, WIPO Doc. VIP/DC/8, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/ 
en/vip_dc/vip_dc_8_rev.pdf. 
232. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97. 
233. See, e.g., Copyright Act, Law No. 43 of 2012, art. 47 (Japan). 
234. See, e.g., Waldfogel Declaration, supra note 185. 
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demand for the plaintiffs’ works have either been non-existent or very 
low. Courts seem also to be cognizant that excessive transaction costs 
may explain why speculations about licensing markets may be 
unpersuasive. The fact that plaintiffs want defendants to license certain 
uses of their works is not sufficient under Campbell and its progeny to 
impose an obligation to license. 
D. Fair Use Is Consistent with International Treaty Obligations 
Some of the fair-use-has-gone-too-far critics claim that the United 
States is out of compliance with its international treaty obligations.235 
One relevant treaty is the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, which is the principal international treaty 
on copyright law and to which the United States became a signatory in 
1989.236 A second is the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs), to which all members of the World Trade 
Organization, of which the U.S. is one, have acceded.237 The Berne 
Convention and the TRIPs Agreement both contain provisions setting 
forth a three-step test that regulates the adoption of national copyright 
exceptions.238 As a foundation for assessment of whether fair use is 
inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations, it is helpful to review the 
origins and evolution of the test that lies at the heart of this debate.239 
When the Berne Convention was revised in 1967, Berne Union 
members sought to harmonize a broader authorial right to control 
reproductions of protected works than had been required under previous 
versions of that treaty.240 Because member states were not in complete 
agreement about just how broad that right should be, the treaty 
established a three-step test for nations to consider when deliberating 
about whether to adopt an exception to the reproduction right.241 
235. Besek Testimony, supra note 4; Ginsburg, supra note 87.  
236. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised 
July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id= 
283693 [hereinafter Berne Convention].  
237. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
238. Berne Convention, supra note 236, art. 9(2); TRIPs Agreement, supra note 237, art. 13. 
239. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais, & Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step Test 
Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
581, 612–16 (2014).  
240. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW 47 (2004). 
241. Id. at 48–51. 
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The first step calls for identifying the specific purpose the exception 
would serve (i.e., it should be focused on “certain special cases”). The 
second step inquires whether the exception would conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work. The third step considers whether the exception 
would otherwise unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests of the rights 
holder.242 Berne Union members’ copyright laws have adopted a wide 
variety of copyright exceptions they consider to be compliant with the 
three-step test.243 
A new phase in the evolution of the three-step test came about when it 
was incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement in 1994.244 The TRIPs 
provision introduced three changes to the test. First, it extended the test 
so that it applies to all copyright exceptions, not just to those affecting 
the reproduction right.245 Second, TRIPs recast the test so that it creates 
some constraint on national adoptions of copyright exceptions.246 Third, 
TRIPs provided a process by which member states can challenge another 
member state with violation of a TRIPs norm if, for example, one of its 
copyright exceptions did not satisfy the three-step test.247 
One reason to believe the U.S. fair use doctrine is consistent with the 
three-step test is that the U.S. asserted that its copyright law, including 
the fair use doctrine, was compatible with Berne norms when it joined 
the Berne Convention in 1989.248 This was five full years after the 
Supreme Court’s Sony decision.249 The U.S. must also have believed its 
fair use doctrine was compatible with its obligations under the TRIPs 
242. Berne Convention, supra note 236, art. 9(2). 
243. The U.S. had adopted all but a few of its exceptions before it joined the Berne Convention in 
1989. 
244. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 237, art. 13. 
245. Id. The TRIPs three-step test also applies to other intellectual property rights. See id. art. 
26(2) (industrial designs); id. art. 30 (patents). 
246. Article 13 states that member states “shall confine” L&Es to those that satisfy the three-step 
test. Id. art. 13. The Berne provision is phrased more permissively, for it says that “[i]t shall be a 
matter for legislation” for nations “to permit the reproduction” of works in accordance with the 
three-step test. Berne Convention, supra note 236, art. 9(2). 
247. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 237, art. 64. 
248. Though perhaps this assertion was made more through omission than by overt declaration. 
See generally U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights & Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 427–522 (1986) (Final Report 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention), reprinted in 10 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & Arts 513 (1986) (discussing Berne compatibility of U.S. copyright law without 
mentioning fair use specifically); see also Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use 
Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39, 77–78 (2000) (describing the official U.S. stance that its 
fair use doctrine was consistent with Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement). 
249. See, e.g., Geiger et al., supra note 239, at 615–16. 
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Agreement in 1994 as its principal instigator.250 This was, of course, the 
very year that Campbell was decided, and a full decade after the Sony 
decision.251 
The “certain special cases” requirement of the three-step test would 
seem to be satisfied because fair use cases fall within reasonably 
predictable patterns.252 The no-conflict-with-normal-exploitation step of 
the test should be satisfied because a use is unlikely to be fair under U.S. 
law if it would harm the market for the work. Fair uses do not otherwise 
unreasonably interfere with legitimate interests of rights holders.253 
Hence, the argument that the U.S. fair use doctrine is compatible with 
the three-step test is strong, and most commentators who have 
considered the question of the compatibility of fair use with the three-
step test have answered this question affirmatively.254 
It seems unlikely that the several countries that have adopted fair use 
or expanded fair dealing exceptions in recent years would have done so 
if fair use was incompatible with TRIPs.255 There is even growing 
250. See, e.g., Gwen Hinze, Peter Jaszi & Matthew Sag, The Fair Use Doctrine in the United 
States – A Response to the Kernochan Report (June 26, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298833. 
251. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, 
in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth Okediji ed., forthcoming 
2015). It is worth noting that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recently ruled that 
member states had discretion to decide that certain types of devices that could be used to make 
private copies caused such minimal harm that no obligation to pay fair compensation arose. Case C-
463/12, Copydan Bandcopi v. Nokia Danark A/S, (Mar. 15, 2015). 
252. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 3, at 2541–42. 
253. Professor Ginsburg has argued that U.S. fair use law is incompatible with the third step of 
this test because the U.S. does not provide compulsory or statutory license fee obligations for 
certain uses she thinks should be permitted only if compensation is provided. See, e.g., Ginsburg, 
supra note 87, at 23; Ginsburg, supra note 167. But most countries do not have compensation 
requirements attached to their copyright exceptions. There is, moreover, no international consensus 
that compulsory or statutory licenses are necessary to satisfy that step, so her interpretation of U.S. 
non-compliance with the three-step test is questionable. For a more fair use-friendly interpretation 
of that third step, see, for example, Geiger et al., supra note 239. 
254.  See, e.g., AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: FINAL 
REPORT 116–22 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/ 
publications/final_report_alrc_122_2nd_december_2013_.pdf (citing several academic experts in 
concluding that fair use complies with the three-step test); Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its 
Politics—At Home and Abroad, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 
(Ruth Okediji ed., forthcoming 2015) (suggesting that fair use can be better reconciled with the 
three-step test when perceived not as an exception itself but as a mechanism for establishing specific 
exceptions). 
255. See, e.g., Jonathan Band & Jonathan Gerafi, The Fair Use/Fair Dealing Handbook, 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Mar. 2015), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/fair-use-
handbook-march-2015.pdf (reporting that more than forty countries have fair use or fair dealing 
provisions). 
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interest in the EU for adoption of fair use or some other type of flexible 
copyright exception in EU member states.256 
Several scholars cite the drafting history of the three-step test in 
support for the proposition that fair use is compatible with international 
treaty obligations. This history “demonstrate[s] that [the test] was 
intended to serve as a flexible balancing tool offering national policy 
makers sufficient breathing space to satisfy economic, social and cultural 
needs.”257 Indeed, the three-step test parallels the U.S. fair use doctrine 
because it considers the purpose of a challenged use, the risk of 
interference with normal exploitations (which inevitably must be 
assessed in light of the nature of the work and how much was taken), 
and other legitimate interests of rights holders, as well as the public, in 
assessing whether the three-step test is satisfied.258 
III. NEW HORIZONS FOR FAIR USE 
Because the law of fair use has evolved rather substantially over the 
course of the past two decades, it stands to reason that it will continue to 
evolve over the next two decades (and beyond). This Part explores three 
directions in which fair use law may evolve in an expansive way: one 
focusing on procedural and substantive refinements of the fair use 
doctrine, a second considering the extent to which fair use might limit 
the ability of copyright owners to enforce contractual or technical 
restrictions, and a third addressing some remedial issues that implicate 
fair use policy. 
A. Refining the Doctrine of Fair Use 
Several doctrinal refinements of the fair use doctrine provide future 
horizons for the evolution of fair use. For the very well-developed 
256. Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/index_en.htm (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2015); Neelie Kroes, Reform of EU Copyright Rules: Your Chance to Give Your Views!, 
EUR. COMMISSION (Jan. 9, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/content/ 
reform-eu-copyright-rules-your-chance-give-your-views. 
257. Geiger et al., supra note 239, at 582. Thirty scholars, mostly from European universities, 
have endorsed a balanced flexible interpretation of this test. See Christophe Geiger et al., 
Declaration: A Balanced Approach to the Interpretation of the “Three Step Test” of Copyright Law, 
39 I.I.C. 707 (2008), available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/declaration_ 
three_step_test_final_english1.pdf. See also Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When 
Copyright Law and Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a 
Global Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1453–56 (2012) (analyzing the three-step test and endorsing 
the Geiger et al. Declaration). 
258. Geiger et al., supra note 239, at 612–13. 
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reasons given in Professor Loren’s symposium contribution, fair use 
should no longer be treated as an affirmative defense for which the 
burden of proof rests on the defendant.259 Equally persuasive are 
Professor Fromer’s arguments that market benefits as well as harms 
should be considered in fair use determinations.260 A few cases have 
taken possible benefits of a defendant’s use into account,261 but this may 
become more common in future cases.262 
Two other refinements that may emerge in future fair use cases are: 
first, a branching off of the iterative copy-different purpose cases from 
the transformative use category; and second, a repudiation of the dual 
presumptions of unfairness and harm in commercial non-transformative 
use cases. These refinements are interrelated because Campbell’s 
retention of the Sony dual negative presumptions has contributed to the 
pressure exerted by defense lawyers and the inclination of courts to 
stretch the meaning of transformativeness to cover the different purpose 
cases.263 
Some iterative copies are, of course, transformative in the 
conventional productive-use sense of that term (that is, an author copies 
something from a prior work in the course of preparing a new work). 
The author of a book on the Kennedy assassination, for instance, once 
259. Loren, supra note 54; see also Steven Hetcher, The Immorality of Strict Liability in 
Copyright, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 14–25 (2013) (arguing that courts, viewing 
copyright law from a tort standard, could shift the burden of proof in fair use cases); Jessica Litman, 
Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 588 (2008) (showing legislative intent to remain 
neutral on burden-of-proof issues). Having read more than 300 fair use decisions for my 
Unbundling Fair Uses article, I believe that Campbell’s assertion that fair use is an affirmative 
defense has not unduly burdened those who defend their uses as fair. In none of those cases was the 
evidence so in equipoise that the defendant lost because it had not carried the burden of persuasion. 
Still, the Court in Campbell erred in this assertion about fair use, and this error should be corrected. 
260. Fromer, supra note 3. 
261. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
argued, No. 13-4829-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2014); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
262. Fromer offers additional insights about why this should happen. Fromer, supra note 3. By 
endorsing market benefits as a fair use consideration, I do not mean to suggest that making 
unauthorized movies of novels should be deemed fair uses merely because a successful movie 
would sell more of the novelists’ books. Authors should have the right to choose and negotiate over 
terms with those who make derivative works of their novels. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The 
Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505 (2013). 
263. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A., No. CIV. 12-
52BRHK/JJK, 2013 WL 4666330, at *11 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2013) (the “lack of alteration [in a 
patent lawyer’s copying of journal articles] may make the label ‘transformative’ a messy fit for 
Schwegman’s use”); Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 
6242843, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) (characterizing patent lawyer copying of journal articles as 
“transformative as evidence supporting a quasi-judicial decision”). 
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used frames from the Zapruder film as important evidence in support of 
his claim that Lee Harvey Oswald was not the lone shooter.264 This was 
obviously a different purpose than Zapruder had in taking the film in the 
first place. This kind of productive use falls squarely within the 
transformative use category that the Court endorsed in Campbell. 
However, iterative copying for different purposes should probably not 
be considered transformative, as it often is in the post-Campbell case 
law.  Search engines, for example, don’t really transform images they 
copied from the Internet, even if the thumbnails are smaller in size than 
the originals, and briefs written by lawyers are not meaningfully 
transformed by Lexis or Westlaw when loaded into their databases of 
legal materials. 
Taking these different purpose use cases out of the transformative 
category should not, however, subject them to the Sony dual negative 
presumptions. Like transformation-of-expression and productive uses, 
different purpose uses often do not supplant demand for the original, as 
in the search engine cases, so the rationale for imposing the negative 
presumptions may not apply to many different purpose uses.265 
The elevation of transformative uses as favoring fair use in Campbell 
evoked some concerns that non-transformative uses would be at greater 
risk of unfairness rulings.266 It is certainly true that some non-
transformative uses, particularly commercial ones, have been found 
unfair.267 But in other cases, non-transformative uses have been deemed 
fair. Especially significant was the Second Circuit’s HathiTrust decision, 
which accepted that enabling print-disabled persons to have improved 
access to books was non-transformative, but nonetheless fair.268 It would 
be a desirable development, in my view, for the courts to follow the lead 
of the Second Circuit in HathiTrust in not presuming, expressly or 
264. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
265. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 3. 
266. See, e.g., Tushnet, Copy This Essay, supra note 58, at 555–60.  
267. See, e.g., Society of Holy Transfiguration v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(unauthorized posting of translations of ancient texts on website); BWP Media USA v. Gossip Cop 
Media, LLC, No. 13 Civ. 7574 (KPF), 2015 WL 321863 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2015) (reproduction of 
photos on media website); Calibrated Success, Inc. v. Charters, No. 13-cv-13127, 2014 WL 
7157154 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2014) (selling exact copies of video); Richards v. Merriam Webster, 
Inc., No. 13-cv-13092-IT, 2014 WL 4843977 (D. Mass. Sept. 26, 2014) (copying seventy percent of 
dictionary entries for online dictionary); Fibresabre Consulting LLC v. Sheehy, No. 11-CV-4719 
(C), 2013 WL 5420977 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013) (reuse of virtual reality content); Vil v. Poteau, 
No. 11-cv-11622-DJC, 2013 WL 3878741 (D. Mass. July 26, 2013) (continued use of learning 
program). 
268. Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2014); see also supra notes 119–
39, 225–30, and accompanying text. 
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implicitly, that non-transformative uses are unfair. 
The HathiTrust decision may give libraries and archives greater 
courage to make and publicly display fair use copies of orphan works—
that is, works whose rights holders cannot be located, even if one makes 
a diligent search—in their collections.269 These non-transformative uses 
of a large number of commercially unavailable works cannot cause harm 
to markets for these works, given that the rights holders of these works 
are either unknown or unlocatable after a diligent search. 
A riskier, even if much desired, goal of libraries and archives would 
be to defend as fair use the scanning of books and other documents in 
research library or archive collections and allowing patrons to access and 
read their contents online.270 One can imagine libraries and archives 
structuring access to digital copies of works in their collections in a 
manner that approximated traditional lending practices (e.g., wrapping 
the digital content in technical protections that would shut down access 
to the book after two weeks and only lending out as many copies as the 
library or archive possesses).271 Academic administrators and librarians 
these days worry that students and even faculty are so used to finding 
information resources online that the books on library shelves are far 
less often sought out as a resource.272 
Thus far, this section has discussed several procedural and substantive 
refinements of the fair use doctrine that symposium authors and I have 
proposed. Other scholarly commentators have identified four other 
aspirations for the future of the fair use doctrine. 
For example, some have proposed that fair use should become more 
broadly applicable in later years of a work’s copyright term.273 
269. See, e.g., David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 
37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2013); Jennifer Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Work 
Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379 (2012). 
270. The Court of Justice of the European Union recently ruled that member states may allow 
libraries, without rights holders’ consent, to digitize certain books in their collections and make 
them available to users for on-site viewing. See Case C-117/13, Technische Universitat Darmstadt 
v. Eugen Ulmer KG (Sept. 11, 2014), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-
117/13. Perhaps fair use could achieve the same objective in the U.S. 
271. See, e.g., Open Library Launches New “Digitize and Lend” E-Book Lending Program, 
PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/content-
and-e-books/article/46253-open-library-launches-new-digitize-and-lend-e-book-lending-program.html. 
See also ASS’N OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR ACADEMIC 
AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES 19–21 (2012), available at http://www.arl.org/storage/documents/ 
publications/code-of-best-practices-fair-use.pdf (creating digital collections of archival and special 
collections materials).  
272. See, e.g., Mary S. Coleman, Opinion, Riches We Must Share . . . , WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/21/AR2005102101451.html. 
273. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Joseph P. 
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Derivative uses that might, for instance, have been unfair in the first five 
or ten years of the commercial life of a book might become fair as the 
work’s commercial value recedes and creative second comers are willing 
decades later to invest in creative reuses of works still in copyright.274 
Some commentators have also urged courts to characterize the fair 
use doctrine as creating “user rights,” not just providing a defense to 
claims of infringement.275 The user right concept is not as radical as it 
might seem to some copyright professionals, for the library-use 
exception in the 1976 Act specifically refers to “fair use rights” to 
indicate that by identifying specific excepted uses, Congress did not 
mean to limit the ability of libraries to assert fair use in response to 
infringement claims.276 Besides, insofar as fair use is the mechanism by 
which First Amendment interests of second comers can be vindicated, 
one would think that just as speakers have First Amendment rights, they 
should have fair use rights, at least as to critical commentary.277 The 
Canadian Supreme Court has endorsed the view that its copyright law’s 
fair dealing provision creates “user rights,”278 so perhaps U.S. courts 
should follow that high court’s lead. 
Another possible future evolution in fair use law would be to make it 
acceptable (again) to speak of First Amendment interests and values in 
fair use cases involving critical commentary. The Supreme Court in 
Harper & Row emphatically rejected The Nation’s First Amendment 
Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002); see also William F. Patry & 
Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1639, 
1650–52 (2004) (proposing specific fair use rules to be applied to certain older works). 
274. An example might be Frederick Colting’s book imagining the life of a once-youthful J.D. 
Salinger character as an old man, written decades after Catcher in the Rye was first published. See 
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing a lower court’s issuance of a preliminary 
injunction against publication of 60 Years Later). 
275. See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A 
LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991); Abraham Drassinower, Taking User Rights Seriously, in IN THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 462, 474 (Michael Geist ed., 2005) 
(“Cast as a user right, what fair dealing shows is . . . that reproduction is not per se wrongful.”); 
David Vaver, Copyright Defenses As User Rights, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 661 (2013). 
276. 117 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (2012). 
277. The Supreme Court has characterized fair use as a doctrine that protects First Amendment 
interests. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003). The copyright case law includes 
examples of copyright owners who have asserted infringement claims with the goal of suppressing 
critical speech. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 
1990). 
278. See, e.g., CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, para. 48 
(Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2004/2004scc13/2004scc13.html (“The fair 
dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In order to maintain 
the proper balance . . . it must not be interpreted restrictively.”). 
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defense because it regarded First Amendment interests as adequately 
protected by fair use and the idea-expression distinction.279 As a result, 
there has been a virtual kibosh on referring to the First Amendment in 
copyright fair use cases, as though mentioning it would weaken one’s 
case.280 Even Campbell, which speaks glowingly of fair use as 
“permit[ting and requiring] courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity 
which that law is designed to foster,”281 does not mention, let alone 
discuss, ways in which First Amendment interests are protected by fair 
use law. First Amendment values should inform fair use to provide 
meaningful breathing room for appropriation artists.282 
Finally, and somewhat more realistically, future fair use cases might 
take into account fair use best practices guidelines that have been 
developed by certain communities of practice, such as documentary 
filmmakers, even when the guidelines were not negotiated among all 
interested stakeholders.283 It is constructive for creative communities to 
develop shared understandings about how fair use should be understood 
279. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–60 (1985). 
280. But see Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689, 703 (W.D. Va. 2014) (referring to the First 
Amendment in a ruling that the defendant was not, as the plaintiff claimed, unqualified to criticize 
him by using excerpts of his work in a later work). For arguments that the First Amendment should 
play a greater role in copyright cases, see, for example, Jed Rubinfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: 
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 7–11 (2002). Professor Netanel sees some recent 
case law bringing fair use and First Amendment values in closer consideration, but he nonetheless 
concludes that “fair use thus provides a highly permeable, often merely theoretical, defense of First 
Amendment interests.” See NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 65–66 (2008) (discussing 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001); Mattel Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
281. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 
207, 236 (1990)). 
282. See Adler, supra note 99. 
283. The Center for Media & Social Impact (formerly the Center for Social Media) at American 
University has helped user communities develop codes of fair use best practices. See, e.g., 
Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use, CENTER FOR MEDIA & SOC. 
IMPACT, http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair-use/best-practices/documentary/documentary-filmmakers-
statement-best-practices-fair-use#statement (last visited Apr. 29, 2015); Code of Best Practices in 
Fair Use for the Visual Arts, C. ART ASS’N (Feb. 2015), http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/fair-use/best-
practices-fair-use-visual-arts.pdf. See generally PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, 
RECLAIMING FAIR USE (2011). Some commentators have criticized non-negotiated guidelines as too 
one-sided to be worthy of deference, but other commentators have endorsed giving some 
consideration to the views of those who developed the guidelines about the scope that fair use ought 
to have. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1946–80 (2007). But see Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Taking 
Users’ Rights to the Next Level: A Pragmatist Approach to Fair Use, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1 (2015). 
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as applied in their particular fields of endeavor. Ultimately, a fair use 
doctrine that encourages and includes the input of creative user 
communities to develop consensus about reasonable in-practice fair uses 
of copyrighted material will have the added benefit of engendering 
respect for copyright law. 
B. Fair Use and Contractual or Technical Restrictions 
Some copyright owners do not wish to make their works available for 
fair uses. Two techniques commonly used to impede fair uses of 
copyrighted works are the adoption of mass-market license agreements 
containing restrictive terms and the implementation of technical 
protection measures (TPMs) that prevent access to or copying of digital 
works.284 The law review literature about fair use and license or 
technical restrictions is ample, and most commentators favor fair use as 
a policy that should trump license and technical restrictions under some 
conditions.285 However, the case law on these issues is at best mixed.286 
One future direction in which fair use law might evolve is in the 
articulation of standards for determining under what circumstances fair 
use should override license or technical restrictions. 
It seems unlikely that courts would accept that fair use should either 
always or never override contractual restrictions. As part of a 
confidentiality agreement between a startup and a big firm, for example, 
the startup’s insistence on a contractual restriction on reverse 
engineering and a pledge to protect program internals as trade secrets 
would very likely be respected. The same restrictions in a mass-market 
license agreement for software might be treated quite differently.287 
Mass-market license terms that purport to restrict criticism of the 
284. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, & the Internet of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 77–78 (2014) (discussing the use of license agreements 
and technical protection measures to restrict product modifications); Netanel, supra note 280, at 
213–15 (discussing the use of such methods as a limitation on speech). 
285. See, e.g., JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 81, 96 (2011). See also infra notes in this subsection for other citations to the literature on fair 
use and license restrictions and for references to the literature on fair use and TPMs. 
286. Concerning enforceability of mass-market license restrictions, see, for example, ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 
255 (5th Cir. 1988) (refusing to enforce mass-market license restrictions on reverse engineering and 
backup copying). Concerning fair use and technical measures, see infra notes 293, 295–296, and 
accompanying text. 
287. See, e.g., David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some 
Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, and “Aggressive Neutrality,” 
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998). 
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copyrighted work or the copyright owner would seem even more 
unlikely to be enforced, if tested in court.288 
But what principles should courts employ to decide when or which 
license restrictions should be unenforceable because they would interfere 
with fair uses? Some commentators have proposed a set of factors that 
courts might consider when faced with having to mediate tensions 
between policies favoring fair use and those favoring freedom of 
contract.289 Others argue that copyright law and policy should preempt 
contractual overrides of fair uses, while still others suggest other 
doctrinal solutions.290 One suggests that a doctrine of “fair breach” of 
licensing restrictions might develop.291 The most promising approach is 
one that would override mass-market license restrictions that interfere 
with copyright policy purposes.292 
It also seems unlikely that fair use should always or never trump 
TPMs, although some support exists for the “never” position.293 A close 
examination of the structure of the anti-circumvention rules suggests that 
Congress left some room for fair use circumventions. The law expressly 
bans circumvention of TPMs that copyright owners use to control access 
to their works, but not circumvention of other types of TPMs, such as 
copy-controls.294 Even as to access controls, Congress created 
exceptions for certain activities that overlap with what fair use would 
allow.295 The anti-circumvention rules also arguably include a fair use 
288. Fair use has been recognized as an important safety valve for protecting First Amendment 
values in copyright cases. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003). The policies of both 
copyright law and the First Amendment support freedom of critical commentary as a federal policy 
that should not be overridden by non-negotiated mass market contracts. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & 
Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of 
Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 877 (1999). 
289. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1235–38 (2010) (recommending some factors that courts should 
consider in determining whether to hold particular state law contract terms preempted by federal 
copyright policy). 
290. See, e.g., MAZZONE, supra note 285; Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and 
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111 (1999); Charles R. McManis, The 
Privatization (or “Shrink-Wrapping”) of American Copyright Law, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 173 (1999).  
291. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Walls: Speculations on Literary Property in 
the Library of the Future, 42 REPRESENTATIONS 53, 63 (1993). 
292. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269–70 (5th Cir. 1988). 
293. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443–44 n.13 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’g 
sub nom. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding 
that Congress did not intend fair use to apply to § 1201); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000) (same).  
294. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012).  
295. See, e.g., id. § 1201(f) (exception to § 1201(a)(1)(A) to allow reverse engineering necessary 
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savings clause.296 
A ban on circumvention of access controls can be justified on the 
ground that users do not have fair use rights as to copyrighted works to 
which they lack lawful access. However, bypassing TPMs to make fair 
use of mass-marketed copies of technically protected works does not on 
its face violate the anti-circumvention rules.297 
That it should be lawful to make fair uses of technically protected 
works is somewhat reinforced by exceptions to the anti-circumvention 
rules that the Copyright Office creates through a triennial rule-making 
procedure.298 One exception created during the 2011 rulemaking 
proceeding was for bypassing the TPM that controls access to DVD 
movies 
where circumvention is undertaken solely in order to make use 
of short portions of the motion pictures for the purpose of 
criticism or comment in the following instances: (i) In 
noncommercial videos; (ii) In documentary films; (iii) In 
nonfiction multimedia ebooks offering film analysis; and (iv) 
For educational purposes in film studies or other courses 
requiring close analysis of film and media excerpts, by college 
and university faculty, college and university students, and 
kindergarten through twelfth grade educators.299 
Courts should perhaps consider that if an activity has been deemed 
worthy of an exception in one rulemaking proceeding, it should be fair 
use to do the same activity in a later period, even if the Copyright Office 
does not renew the exception in a later proceeding.300 Commentators 
for interoperability); cf. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (reverse 
engineering of software to achieve interoperability is fair use). 
296. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1); see, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 
1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (perceiving this provision as a fair use savings clause). 
297. See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine 
the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619 (2003) (noting that access 
control TPMs were becoming common and discussing implications of this for the scope of the anti-
circumvention rules). 
298. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C). The existence of this rulemaking process does not, in my 
view, undercut the argument that fair use circumventions are lawful, but it is significant that the 
Copyright Office has an obligation to consider whether fair and other privileged uses of copyrighted 
works are being interfered with and to establish an exception to the anti-circumvention rules when a 
good case for such an exception has been made. 
299. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65260, 65266 (Oct. 26, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 
201.40(b) (2014)). 
300. An even better reform would be to make DMCA exceptions, once granted, permanent rather 
than putting fair users to the task of making the same case every three years. 
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have proposed some alternative mechanisms to facilitate the making of 
fair uses of technically protected works.301 There should, moreover, be 
an implied right to make a circumvention tool to enable fair uses.302 The 
anti-circumvention rulemaking process itself is in need of reforms to 
make it less cumbersome for prospective fair users.303 
C. Remedial Adjustments 
There are at least two adjustments to copyright remedy rules in which 
fair use considerations should play a role. One concerns awards of 
compensation in lieu of injunctive relief, and the other should limit 
awards of statutory damages. 
The Supreme Court in Campbell recognized that there may be “a 
strong public interest” in access to creative reuses of existing works, 
which courts should take into account in deciding whether to order 
injunctive relief in close fair use cases: 
Because the fair use inquiry often requires close questions of 
judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases 
involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also 
wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law, “to 
stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,” are 
not always best served by automatically granting injunctive 
relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds 
of fair use.304 
Despite the Court’s endorsement of this important idea, there has 
been to date no case in which courts have withheld injunctions in close 
fair uses that were just over the line.305 One welcome doctrinal 
301. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1095 (2003); Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable 
Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 
(2007); Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have to Give Notice About 
Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41 (2007). 
302. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999). 
303. See, e.g., Aaron K. Perzanowski, Evolving Standards and the Future of the DMCA 
Rulemaking, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2007). 
304. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10. (1994) (citation omitted). 
305. Some commentators have recommended that compensation, not injunctions, should be 
ordered in response to creative but infringing derivative works. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, 
Hiroshige v. Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 61 (2000); Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright 
Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271 (2008). 
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development for the future of fair use would be for courts to finally take 
the Court’s endorsement of compensation instead of injunctions in just-
over-the-line fair use cases. This might be especially useful in future 
appropriation art cases if the taking was too substantial to be fair use or 
in other creative derivative work cases.306 
A second remedial development that would be desirable would be 
judicial limits on awards of statutory damages in close but unsuccessful 
fair use cases. The 1976 Act allows successful plaintiffs to request, in 
lieu of an award of actual damages and profits of the defendant 
attributable to infringement, an award of statutory damages in any 
amount between the $750 per infringed work minimum and $150,000 
per infringed work maximum.307 In some close, plausible fair use cases, 
courts have awarded minimum statutory damages,308 but in others, 
courts have awarded the maximum, finding the infringement willful 
notwithstanding the plausible fair use claim.309 Judicial limits on 
statutory damage awards would lessen the chilling effect on plausible 
fair uses about which many commentators have expressed concern.310 In 
some cases, the minimum statutory damage award may be appropriate, 
but higher awards should only be available to approximate actual 
damages.311 Awards of attorney fees should perhaps also be limited in 
close fair use cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress expected the fair use doctrine to evolve when it passed the 
306. One can also hope that courts in the future would be more wary than was the District Court 
in Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 355–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), of using the impoundment and 
destruction of infringing copies remedies under the 1976 Act or ordering defendants to inform their 
customers that the customers will be unable to resell or publicly display the infringing paintings 
they had unwittingly purchased. 
307. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). Statutory damage awards over $30,000 per infringed work are 
available if the infringement is “willful,” id., but courts have often given this term a very broad 
interpretation. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright 
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009). 
308. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131, at *15 (E.D. Va. 
Oct. 4, 1996). 
309. See, e.g., Macklin v. Mueck, No. 00-10492-CIV, 2005 WL 1529259, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 
28, 2005) (awarding $300,000 in a default judgment for unauthorized posting of two poems on a 
poetry website). 
310. See, e.g., Michael Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 
891 (2012); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 307, at 443. 
311. If the plaintiff’s usual license fee for a use is above $750, it may be reasonable to provide a 
statutory damage award that is or approximates that license fee.  
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1976 Act,312 and evolve it certainly has. Some of that evolution has been 
due to the useful framework that fair use provides for balancing 
competing interests when disputes arise in the far more complex 
copyright ecosystem today as compared to 1976. Congress certainly did 
not foresee the advent of digital networked environments in which every 
access to and use of a work involves a reproduction, but fortunately the 
codification of fair use has helped courts sort out which of these 
reproductions are fair or foul. 
Campbell was, of course, a relatively conventional type of fair use 
case, considering whether a parody of a popular song was fair use.313 But 
the framework it provided for assessing fair use defenses has proved 
useful in a wide array of cases, including those posed by digital copies 
made by search engines and for online course reserves. This Article has 
shown that the post-Campbell case law has, for the most part, been 
uncontroversial. The Court’s Sony decision has taken more heat than 
Campbell as having caused fair use to expand beyond what some think 
are its proper bounds. The most controversial of the Campbell legacy 
decisions have been those involving iterative copies of copyrighted 
works for different purposes than the original that did not result in the 
creation of a second work that builds upon the pre-existing work. This 
Article has shown that while it may be desirable to limit the category of 
“transformative purpose” cases to those that involve the production of a 
subsequent work incorporating expression from the first, the different 
purpose cases are often, although not always, justifiable as fair uses. 
Those who would prefer for fair use to be more bounded have leveled 
various criticisms against Sony, Campbell, and their progeny. It is 
possible, although not likely, that some courts will tighten up on fair use 
in future appropriation art cases. Perhaps some will be more skeptical of 
the different purpose cases in the future too. However, the decisions 
built on the Sony and Campbell foundations have become the new 
normal. I will be surprised if the courts radically cut back on fair use as 
312. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (“The 
bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no 
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change. . . . [T]he courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case 
basis.”). 
313. Some of the earliest twentieth century fair use cases involved parodies, specifically 
vaudeville impersonations. See, e.g., The Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive 
Fair Use After Betamax, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1395 (1984) (citing Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Mitzensheimer, 177 F. 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Bloom & Hamlin 
v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903) as the earliest parody cases); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 31–32. 
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some critics hope. Nor does licensing of permitted uses, such as online 
course reserves, seem likely to be adopted. So I predict that the status of 
fair use under Campbell and its progeny will and should prevail. Part II 
has also defended the post-Campbell fair use decisions as compatible 
with U.S. treaty obligations. 
How far will fair use evolve beyond the current status quo? Part III 
has suggested many possibilities. Of the new horizons explored here, the 
shift away from conceiving of fair use as an affirmative defense and the 
shift toward taking account of market benefits as well as harms seem to 
be reasonably plausible future developments in the law as Professors 
Loren and Fromer have recommended. One might have expected 
Campbell to have resulted in more judgments of compensation instead of 
injunctions in close fair use cases, but perhaps courts will come to be 
more comfortable with this option in the future. 
The case law does not (yet) recognize fair use as a policy that should 
be considered as a basis for overriding mass-market license restrictions, 
although the policy arguments for this are strong. But this may be 
because firms have been reluctant to bring a lawsuit that would set what 
they would regard as an unfortunate precedent. Fair use policy 
arguments are similarly strong in favor of allowing circumvention of 
TPMs to make fair uses of digital copies of protected works. Even the 
Copyright Office has recognized fair use circumventions to some degree 
in its triennial rulemakings. Perhaps there will be future fair use cases to 
make it official. 
Given how many surprising developments there have been in the fair 
use case law in the past two decades, it seems likely there will be some 
equally surprising developments in the next twenty-one years. I hope I 
live long enough to experience and celebrate them as well. 
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